Democracy in the Balance: A 21st-Century Audit

This is the second of my essays on the topic of democracy, the parlous state of which I have been researching over recent months – not a very edifying situation I am sorry to say. Nonetheless, my sense as a citizen journalist is it that this is a really important issue for our collective consideration, so the following is offered in that spirit. The other is called A Gathering Storm for Global Freedom: Democracy Under Threat Kevin Parker – Site Publisher

Introduction: The Enduring Question of Democracy

We live in a paradoxical age for the democratic ideal. On one hand, democracy has been hailed as a universal value, the “preeminently acceptable form of governance” that defined the aspirations of the twentieth century.¹ On the other, it is weathering a profound global crisis, a steady erosion of norms and institutions that has been termed a “democratic recession.”² For the first time in over two decades, autocracies now outnumber democracies, with a staggering 72% of the world’s population—5.8 billion people—living under autocratic rule.³ This stark reality lends a renewed urgency to one of political philosophy’s most fundamental questions: What, precisely, do we mean by a functioning democracy?

This report argues that a functioning democracy is not a static achievement marked by the simple presence of elections, but a dynamic and demanding process of balancing freedom and equality through accountable institutions. This process is now under severe threat from a sophisticated new brand of authoritarianism that hollows out democracy from within and from disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) that provide autocrats with unprecedented tools of control. To understand this contemporary challenge, we must first dissect the anatomy of the democratic ideal, establishing the core principles and benchmarks against which the health of any political system can be measured.

From this foundation, this analysis will chart the historical trajectory of democracy through the twentieth century, examining the great “waves” of democratization and critically reassessing the so-called “golden moment” of the post-Cold War era. It will then present a data-driven diagnosis of democracy’s current decline, detailing the playbook of modern authoritarianism and the coordinated nature of its global assault. Finally, looking toward the future, this report will envision an ideal democratic order capable of addressing global challenges, make the enduring case for democracy’s intrinsic and instrumental value, and outline a strategic playbook for its restoration and renewal in the face of authoritarian drift and the AI revolution.

Part I: The Anatomy of a Functioning Democracy

Defining the Ideal: From Ancient Principles to Modern Practice

The concept of democracy traces its origins to the Greek city-states of the 5th century BC, where the term dēmokratía—a compound of dêmos (“people”) and krátos (“rule”)—was coined to describe “rule of the people.”⁴ This foundational idea derives its enduring moral strength and popular appeal from two key principles: individual autonomy, the notion that people should be able to control their own lives, and equality, the idea that everyone should have the same opportunity to influence the decisions that affect society.⁵ These ancient principles remain the philosophical bedrock upon which all modern conceptions of democracy are built.

In contemporary political science, a crucial distinction exists between “minimalist” and “maximalist” conceptions of democracy.⁶ A minimalist definition, often associated with theorists like Joseph Schumpeter, views democracy simply as a method for choosing and removing governments through competitive elections.⁷ A maximalist, or substantive, definition argues that for elections to be meaningful, they must be embedded in a much broader ecosystem of guaranteed civil liberties, human rights, and the rule of law.⁸ This report adopts the maximalist standard, as a system that holds elections without protecting fundamental freedoms cannot be considered a truly functioning democracy.

Synthesizing these threads, a modern, functioning democracy can be defined as a system of governance where the freely expressed will of the people forms the basis of governmental authority.⁹ This will is realized not merely through periodic elections but through a complex and interdependent bundle of institutions and rights that collectively ensure political freedom, legal equality, and robust mechanisms for public control and government accountability.¹⁰ It is a legal form of rule that enables self-determination for all citizens by guaranteeing their significant and continuous participation in, and oversight of, the political process.

The Bedrock Principles: Rights, Equality, and Accountability

A functioning democracy rests on a tripod of non-negotiable principles: freedom, equality, and control. These dimensions are not a menu from which to choose; they are mutually reinforcing and collectively essential. The absence of any one leg causes the entire structure to collapse.

The first principle is Freedom, which manifests as a comprehensive suite of guaranteed rights and liberties. This includes the foundational civil liberties of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and belief, which are enshrined in international covenants like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹¹ Crucially, this dimension also requires a free, independent, and pluralistic media, which serves as a vital source of alternative information and a watchdog against the abuse of power.¹² These freedoms are the prerequisites for an informed citizenry, enabling voters to make meaningful choices and participate fully in the life of their society.¹³

The second principle is Equality, which demands both fairness in process and inclusion in practice. Its most visible feature is universal and equal suffrage—the principle of “one person, one vote” in free, fair, and regular elections.¹⁴ Beyond the ballot box, equality means that all citizens are equal before the law and have equal access to legislative processes, with robust protections for minority rights to prevent the “tyranny of the majority.”¹⁵ A true democracy is not merely rule of the majority; it is government on behalf of all the people, ensuring that the human rights of every individual are protected regardless of which party is in power.¹⁶

The third principle is Control, which ensures that government is transparent, accountable, and subject to the rule of law.¹⁷ The primary mechanism for this is the separation of powers: an independent judiciary and a legislature capable of acting as counterweights to the executive branch are essential to prevent the concentration and abuse of power.¹⁸ This institutional architecture must be complemented by robust legislative oversight, a vibrant and independent civil society that holds power to account, and strong ethical frameworks to prevent corruption.¹⁹ Ultimately, a government must be able to demonstrate its trustworthiness and responsiveness to the needs and expectations of the people it serves.²⁰

Measuring the Immeasurable: Benchmarking Democratic Health

To move from abstract principles to concrete analysis, it is necessary to measure the health of democracy across countries and over time. Over the past several decades, political scientists have developed sophisticated democracy indexes to provide these benchmarks, allowing for rigorous, objective, and transparent comparisons of democratic performance.²¹ While numerous indices exist, three are widely considered the most authoritative and will be referenced throughout this report to provide a comprehensive picture of global trends.

The first is the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, based at the University of Gothenburg. V-Dem offers a uniquely multidimensional and disaggregated dataset, reflecting the complexity of democracy by distinguishing between five high-level principles: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian.²² The second is Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report, the oldest American organization devoted to democracy support, which has been tracking political rights and civil liberties since 1973.²³ Its methodology is derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and it classifies countries into three categories: Free, Partly Free, and Not Free.²⁴ The third is The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index, which began in 2006 and provides a snapshot of democracy based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties.²⁵ The EIU classifies regimes into four types: “full democracy,” “flawed democracy,” “hybrid regime,” or “authoritarian regime.”²⁶

The very existence of these different measurement systems reveals a deeper truth about the concept of democracy itself. The choice of what to measure and how to weigh it is not a purely technical decision but a normative one, reflecting a particular philosophical vision of what matters most in a democratic system. Freedom House, founded in 1941 to combat fascism, places a heavy emphasis on fundamental rights and liberties, a legacy of its origins in the struggle against totalitarianism.³¹ In contrast, the EIU’s inclusion of categories like “functioning of government” and “political culture” reflects a more holistic, governance-centric perspective that assesses the practical outputs and societal underpinnings of a political system.³² V-Dem’s highly granular, multi-principle approach represents a scholarly effort to capture the full, complex tapestry of democratic practice, moving beyond simple classifications to a more nuanced understanding.³³

This divergence is not a weakness but a source of analytical strength, providing a stereoscopic view of global trends. A compelling example is the classification of the United States. While Freedom House continues to rate the U.S. as “Free,” albeit with a declining score, the EIU downgraded it to a “flawed democracy” in 2016, a status it retains today.³⁴ This difference highlights a critical contemporary debate: can a country remain a functioning democracy if its core political rights and civil liberties are largely intact, but its institutional functionality, political culture, and public trust are severely degraded? The differing conclusions of the major indices show that the answer depends entirely on which dimension of democracy one chooses to prioritize.

Part II: A Century of Democratic Tides

The Ebb and Flow: Huntington’s Waves of Democratization

The history of democracy in the modern era is not a story of linear progress but one of dramatic advances followed by disheartening retreats. The most influential framework for understanding this turbulent history was developed by the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, who conceptualized the spread of democracy in terms of “waves.” Huntington defined a democratic wave as “a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite directions during that period of time.”³⁵

Huntington identified three major waves of democratization since the early 19th century. The first “long” wave began with the expansion of suffrage in the United States and continued until 1926, bringing the number of democracies to 29. This was followed by the first reverse wave (1922–42), driven by the rise of fascism, communism, and militarism, which reduced the number of democracies to just twelve.³⁶ The second wave began with the Allied victory in World War II and peaked in 1962 with 36 democracies, fueled by decolonization and post-war reconstruction.³⁷ A second reverse wave followed, characterized by military coups and the consolidation of authoritarian rule in many newly independent states, reducing the number of democracies to 30 by the mid-1970s.³⁸

The third wave of democratization, the most dramatic and widespread, began with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974.³⁹ It swept through Southern Europe (Spain, Greece), then Latin America in the 1980s, parts of Asia (the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan), and, most spectacularly, Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-91.⁴⁰ Huntington attributed this unprecedented expansion to several key factors: the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes, unprecedented global economic growth, a pro-democratic shift within the Catholic Church, and the influence of external actors like the United States and the European Community.⁴¹ This third wave fundamentally reshaped the global political landscape, making democracy the world’s dominant and most sought-after form of government.

Searching for a “Golden Moment”

The period immediately following the end of the Cold War is often viewed as a “golden moment” for democracy, a time of unbridled optimism famously captured in Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis. The data certainly support the idea of a quantitative leap. As recently as 1977, only 35 of 143 rated countries (24%) qualified as democracies, while 62% were autocracies.⁴² By the end of the 20th century, the number of democracies had more than doubled, and by 2017, 57% of the world’s countries were democratic, marking a historic peak.⁴³

However, a critical reassessment of this period reveals a more complex and troubling picture. The “golden moment” was characterized more by the quantity of new democracies than by their quality. Many of the countries that transitioned during the third wave were what the EIU would later classify as “flawed democracies” or “hybrid regimes,” systems that adopted the formal architecture of democracy—such as multiparty elections—but lacked deep institutional roots, a robust rule of law, and a strong democratic political culture.⁴⁴ The international community’s focus on the minimalist criterion of elections often obscured these profound underlying weaknesses in government functionality, protection of civil liberties, and public accountability.

This reveals a crucial connection between the triumphs of the third wave and the troubles of the present. The very nature of the third wave’s expansion sowed the seeds of the current democratic recession. Unlike the slow, organic development of democracy in the West, the post-Cold War wave was driven by the sudden collapse of an alternative ideology (communism) and intense external pressure from a triumphant West. This led many nations to adopt democratic forms with great speed, but without the corresponding, and much slower, development of democratic substance—the independent judiciaries, professional civil services, free press, and culture of tolerance and compromise that make democracy work. These new “electoral democracies” were often built on shallow foundations. When the geopolitical pressures of the unipolar moment eased and new challenges arose—from the 2008 financial crisis to the rise of China and Russia as confident authoritarian models—these weak foundations began to crack. The democratic recession, therefore, was not a sudden or surprising reversal, but the predictable and gradual erosion of the third wave’s most fragile gains.

Part III: The State of the Union: Democracy in the 21st Century

The Democratic Recession: A Global Malaise

Around the year 2006, the global expansion of democracy came to a halt, marking the beginning of what Stanford political scientist Larry Diamond has termed a “democratic recession.”⁴⁵ This was not a dramatic reverse wave of coups and revolutions, but a more insidious and protracted period of decline, characterized by the breakdown of some democracies, the erosion of democratic quality in many others, and the deepening of authoritarianism elsewhere.⁴⁶ The latest data from the world’s leading democracy-tracking organizations paint a grim and unambiguous picture of this global malaise.

The V-Dem Institute’s Democracy Report 2025 concludes that the level of democracy enjoyed by the average world citizen has regressed to 1985 levels.⁴⁷ The report identifies 45 countries currently undergoing “autocratization”—the process of democratic backsliding—while only 19 are democratizing.⁴⁸ Most alarmingly, 72% of the world’s population, or 5.8 billion people, now live in autocracies, the highest proportion since 1978.⁴⁹ Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2024 report marks the 18th consecutive year of decline in global freedom, a trend it first measured in 2005.⁵⁰ In 2023, 52 countries saw their scores decline, while only 21 improved, with the manipulation of elections and armed conflict being primary drivers of this deterioration.⁵¹

The EIU’s Democracy Index for 2024 recorded a new all-time low for its global average score, falling to 5.17 out of 10.⁵² According to its classification, only 6.6% of the world’s population lives in a “full democracy,” while 39.2% reside in “authoritarian regimes.”⁵³ The report notes a particularly steep decline in the “functioning of government” category, highlighting a growing crisis of governance and a collapse of public trust in political institutions, even in established democracies.⁵⁴ Taken together, these data points confirm that the democratic recession is not a temporary downturn but a deep-seated, global phenomenon that has reshaped the political landscape of the 21st century.

The Antithesis: The Nature of Modern Authoritarianism

The primary threat to democracy today is not the overt, jackbooted totalitarianism of the 20th century, but a more subtle and sophisticated form of authoritarian rule. Modern authoritarianism is a political system characterized by the rejection of political pluralism, the use of strong central power to preserve the status quo, and the systematic reduction of civil liberties and the rule of law.⁵⁵ Crucially, these regimes often maintain the facade of democratic institutions—holding regular but non-competitive elections, for instance—to create a veneer of legitimacy while hollowing out any real democratic substance.⁵⁶

Aspiring autocrats in the 21st century follow a well-established playbook to dismantle democracy from within, often using what are known as “salami tactics” to slice away at democratic norms and institutions gradually.⁵⁷ This playbook includes several key moves:

1. Politicizing Independent Institutions: The first targets are often the referees of the democratic game. Autocrats seek to capture or neutralize independent bodies like the judiciary, election commissions, and the civil service by stacking them with loyalists, thereby removing critical checks on their power.⁵⁸
2. Spreading Disinformation: Modern authoritarians deliberately propagate falsehoods through state-aligned media and coordinated online networks. The goal is not always to convince the public of a specific lie, but to sow doubt and confusion, undermine the very notion of objective truth, and insulate the regime from accountability.⁵⁹
3. Aggrandizing Executive Power: They systematically weaken legislatures and expand the power of the executive, often justifying these moves as necessary to overcome political gridlock and enact the “will of the people.”⁶⁰
4. Quashing Dissent: A strong democracy requires a strong opposition and a free press. Authoritarians attack these sources of dissent, harassing critical journalists, placing restrictions on civil society organizations, and legally targeting political opponents.⁶¹
5. Corrupting Elections: While they may not abolish elections, they corrupt them. This is achieved through tactics like partisan gerrymandering, voter suppression laws, and exerting control over electoral machinery to ensure that the opposition cannot compete on a level playing field.⁶²
6. Scapegoating and Polarization: Many modern authoritarians intentionally stoke social and cultural divisions. By attacking vulnerable groups and manufacturing grievances, they forge a loyal political base and turn citizens against one another, making unified democratic opposition more difficult.⁶³

A World Divided: A Global Snapshot

The result of these trends is a world increasingly divided between democratic and authoritarian blocs. The latest reports show a continued resilience of democracy in its traditional heartlands, with Western Europe remaining the most democratic region globally.⁶⁴ However, significant backsliding is occurring elsewhere, with Eastern Europe and South and Central Asia experiencing particularly steep declines in democratic health.⁶⁵ Major powers like China and Russia have become more deeply entrenched in their authoritarian models, while many “swing states” or “hybrid regimes” in Africa, Asia, and Latin America hang in the balance, potentially tipping the global scales one way or the other.⁶⁶

This is not simply a series of disconnected national crises. A defining feature of the current era is the rise of coordinated authoritarianism. The world’s autocratic regimes are learning from one another, sharing tactics of repression, and working together to undermine democratic norms and institutions on the international stage.⁶⁷ China, in particular, has become a major exporter of its model of “tech-enhanced authoritarianism,” providing sophisticated surveillance technologies and governance training to illiberal regimes around the globe.⁶⁸ This transforms the problem from one of domestic democratic backsliding into a systemic global challenge. A loose but increasingly effective alliance of authoritarian states is now actively competing with the democratic world, creating a new ideological struggle that will define the 21st century.

Part IV: Envisioning a Democratic Future

The Cosmopolitan Ideal: Democracy Beyond the Nation-State

In an era of profound global interconnectedness, the traditional model of democracy confined within the borders of the nation-state is facing a crisis of efficacy. Decisions made by transnational corporations, international financial institutions, or the governments of powerful states can have profound impacts on the lives of people thousands of miles away, who have no say in those decisions.⁶⁹ This reality has given rise to the theory of “cosmopolitan democracy,” a political project most closely associated with thinkers like David Held and Daniele Archibugi, which seeks to apply democratic principles of transparency, accountability, and participation to the global sphere.⁷⁰

The core premise of cosmopolitan democracy is that in a globalized world, the nation-state is no longer a sufficient container for democratic accountability.⁷¹ The theory does not advocate for a monolithic world government, but rather for a multi-layered system of democratic governance that complements, rather than replaces, the state.⁷² This vision is built on the guiding principle that all those affected by a decision should have the opportunity to be involved in the decision-making process.⁷³

To achieve this, cosmopolitan democrats propose a series of ambitious institutional reforms aimed at democratizing global governance. A central proposal is the creation of regional and global parliamentary assemblies, such as a directly-elected United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, which would give citizens a direct voice in global politics, independent of their national governments.⁷⁴ Another key element is the strengthening of international legal institutions, including empowering the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to create and enforce a genuine global rule of law.⁷⁵ Finally, the project calls for the deep democratization of existing international organizations like the UN, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, transforming them from clubs of states into bodies that are transparent and accountable to a wider range of global stakeholders, including civil society.⁷⁶

A Blueprint for Global Governance

Applying the principles of cosmopolitan democracy provides a blueprint for how an ideal global order could address the most pressing challenges of our time. Such a system would be founded on a universal framework of human rights, with robust international institutions capable of holding both states and powerful individuals accountable for abuses, moving beyond the current system’s reliance on the inconsistent political will of sovereign states.⁷⁷ Transnational challenges that inherently defy national borders, such as climate change, would be managed by global bodies with the democratic legitimacy and legal authority to implement and enforce binding agreements, reflecting the interests of all affected stakeholders, not just the most powerful nations.⁷⁸

This framework would also advance universal norms like gender equality, ensuring women’s full and equal participation in all levels of governance, from the local to the global.⁷⁹ It would establish a system of global accountability for transnational corporations (TNCs), which currently operate in a regulatory space that no single state can effectively control.⁸⁰ By subjecting TNCs to global standards for labor rights, environmental protection, and human rights, a cosmopolitan order would address the reality that these corporations already act as powerful governors of the global economy, often without any democratic legitimacy.⁸¹ Finally, in the realm of peace and security, the model prioritizes non-violence and the resolution of conflicts through international law and diplomacy, with the use of force relegated to a last resort, authorized and controlled by legitimate, representative global institutions.⁸²

The most common objection to this vision is that it requires an unacceptable surrender of national sovereignty. However, this critique often overlooks the extent to which de facto sovereignty has already been eroded by the forces of globalization. In the 21st century, states are increasingly unable to independently control their own economies, protect their environments, or manage their information spaces.⁸³ This creates a profound paradox: in order to regain meaningful control over the forces that shape their citizens’ lives, states may need to pool their sovereignty in stronger, more democratic international institutions. True sovereignty in a globalized world may not be about clinging to the illusion of absolute autonomy, but about securing an effective voice in the collective decision-making that governs the planet. This reframes the debate from a zero-sum game of “losing sovereignty” to a positive-sum endeavor of “enhancing collective self-determination.”

Part V: The Case for and Restoration of Democracy

Why Democracy? The Enduring Arguments

In an era of democratic malaise and rising authoritarian confidence, it is essential to restate the fundamental case for democracy. The arguments are both philosophical and empirical, appealing to our highest ideals and our most practical concerns. The Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has provided one of the most powerful and comprehensive philosophical justifications, arguing that democracy is a universal value for three distinct reasons.⁸⁴

First, democracy has intrinsic value. The ability to participate in the political life of one’s community is a fundamental component of human flourishing and a life of dignity; political freedom is not merely a means to an end, but an end in itself.⁸⁵ Second, democracy has instrumental value. By creating mechanisms of accountability, democracy provides political incentives for governments to be responsive to the needs of their people.⁸⁶ Sen’s most famous and compelling piece of evidence for this is his observation that in the history of the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred in a functioning democracy with a relatively free press, because democratic governments must face public criticism and cannot survive elections if they fail to prevent such catastrophes.⁸⁷ Third, democracy has constructive value. Through the processes of public debate, open discussion, and the free exchange of ideas—what Sen calls “government by discussion”—societies form and clarify their values, needs, and priorities.⁸⁸

These philosophical arguments are powerfully reinforced by a wealth of empirical evidence demonstrating that, on average, democracies deliver superior outcomes for their citizens. Economically, countries that transition to democracy experience, on average, a 20% increase in GDP over 25 years; democracy fosters more stable growth and is far better at preventing catastrophic economic collapses than autocracy.⁸⁹ In terms of health and well-being, democracies have higher life expectancy, dramatically lower infant mortality, and provide significantly better access to education, safe water, and electricity.⁹⁰ Democracies are also far more peaceful; they are exceptionally unlikely to go to war with one another and are less prone to civil war and internal political violence.⁹¹

The Authoritarian Drift and the AI Revolution: Twin Challenges

The contemporary assault on democracy is driven by the convergence of two powerful forces: the political strategy of modern authoritarianism and the technological disruption of artificial intelligence. These are not separate challenges but a synergistic threat, where AI acts as a powerful accelerant for every tactic in the modern authoritarian playbook. This convergence poses an unprecedented danger to the core pillars of democratic governance: representation, accountability, and trust.⁹²

AI provides authoritarian regimes with formidable new tools of repression and social control.

• Mass Surveillance: AI-powered surveillance systems, from facial recognition cameras to sophisticated social credit systems, enable a level of monitoring and social control previously confined to dystopian fiction. This pervasive surveillance has a profound chilling effect on free expression and association, as citizens learn to self-censor for fear of retribution.⁹³
• Disinformation at Scale: The rise of generative AI allows for the creation of hyper-realistic fake text, images, and videos—”deepfakes”—at a scale and speed never before possible. This technology can be used to flood the information ecosystem with targeted propaganda and misinformation, eroding the shared factual basis required for democratic debate and making it nearly impossible for citizens to distinguish truth from falsehood.⁹⁴
• Targeted Repression: AI can be used to analyze vast datasets to identify and monitor political dissidents, activists, and potential challengers with ruthless efficiency. This automates and scales up the work of the secret police, making opposition to the regime even more perilous.⁹⁵

A Playbook for Renewal: Mechanisms and Strategies for the 21st Century

Confronting this dual threat requires a two-pronged strategy for democratic renewal. It is not enough to simply play defense and patch the vulnerabilities in existing systems; democracy must also innovate, adapt, and prove its continued superiority in meeting the challenges of a new era. This requires both hardening democratic defenses and reimagining democratic practice.

The first strategy is to harden democratic defenses against authoritarian assault. This involves action on three fronts.

1. Institutional Fortification: Democracies must proactively strengthen their core institutions. This includes modernizing legislative procedures to prevent obstruction and abuse, codifying unwritten democratic norms into law to make them less vulnerable to violation, and passing transformative voting rights legislation to ensure all citizens can access the ballot box and that all votes are counted fairly.⁹⁶ It also means reinforcing the independence and integrity of the judiciary, the civil service, and law enforcement.⁹⁷
2. Countering Authoritarian Influence: The struggle for democracy is global, and it requires a coordinated international response. Democratic nations must work together to combat transnational repression, expose and sanction kleptocracy (which is a pillar of modern authoritarianism), and develop a unified strategy to push back against the global export of authoritarian models and surveillance technologies.⁹⁸
3. Regulating AI: To mitigate the harms of AI, democracies must establish strong legal and regulatory guardrails. This includes enacting laws that require clear labeling and transparency for AI-generated political content, establishing robust data privacy protections to limit the raw material for surveillance, and holding AI developers and social media platforms accountable when their tools are used to deceive voters and undermine elections.⁹⁹

The second, equally vital, strategy is to innovate democratic practice. Democracy cannot win by standing still; it must evolve to become more inclusive, responsive, and resilient.

1. Harnessing AI for Democratic Renewal: While AI poses threats, it also offers remarkable opportunities. AI tools can be used to analyze public input and feedback at a massive scale, allowing governments to become more responsive to citizen needs.¹⁰⁰ It can facilitate new forms of large-scale public engagement, such as AI-assisted citizens’ assemblies, where diverse groups of citizens can deliberate on complex policy issues and generate informed recommendations.¹⁰¹
2. Empowering Civil Society and Pro-Democracy Movements: The front lines of the democratic struggle are often occupied by activists and civil society organizations. The international community must provide these groups with sustained support and new tools to help them organize, mobilize, and counter state propaganda in an increasingly hostile digital environment.¹⁰² This includes exploring how AI itself can be leveraged by democracy movements to their advantage.¹⁰³
3. Inspiring a Culture of Commitment: Ultimately, democracy depends on the values and commitments of its citizens. This requires a long-term investment in rebuilding a shared civic culture through comprehensive civic education, creating a new civic information architecture that supports common purpose over polarization, and dramatically expanding civic bridging programs that bring people together across political and social divides.¹⁰⁴

Conclusion: The Unfinished Journey

Democracy is not an endpoint to be reached, but an “endless journey” of continuous struggle, adaptation, and renewal.¹⁰⁵ The current global democratic recession is a serious, systemic crisis, driven by a potent combination of sophisticated authoritarian strategies and transformative technological change. The data are clear: freedom is in retreat, and the balance of power in the world is shifting away from democratic governance.

Yet, this trajectory is not irreversible. The history of the 20th century shows that democratic tides can turn, and past phases of autocratization have been fought and reversed by the determined efforts of ordinary people.¹⁰⁶ The case for democracy—grounded in its unique ability to protect human dignity, foster prosperity, and maintain peace—remains as compelling today as it has ever been. Its future now depends on the ability of its proponents to mount a defense as sophisticated and determined as the assault it faces.

Success will require a sustained, collaborative, and innovative effort from citizens, civil society, and democratic governments working in concert. It will demand both the fortification of our most essential democratic institutions and the courage to boldly reinvent democratic practices for a new and challenging era. The contest between democracy and authoritarianism will be the defining struggle of the 21st century, and its outcome will determine whether a government “of the people, by the people, for the people” shall flourish or perish from the Earth.¹⁰⁷

Notes

1. Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 (1999): 3–17, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/democracy-as-a-universal-value/.
2. Larry Diamond, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (2015): 141–55, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/facing-up-to-the-democratic-recession/.
3. V-Dem Institute, Democracy Report 2025: 25 Years of Autocratization – Democracy Trumped? (Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, 2025), 6, https://www.v-dem.net/documents/60/V-dem-dr__2025_lowres.pdf.
4. “Democracy,” Wikipedia, accessed September 10, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy.
5. Council of Europe, “Democracy,” Compass: Manual for Human Rights Education with Young People, accessed September 10, 2025, https://www.coe.int/en/web/compass/democracy.
6. Adam Przeworski, “Who Decides What Is ‘Democratic’?,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (2019): 132–44, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/who-decides-what-is-democratic/.
7. Russell J. Dalton, Doh C. Shin, and Willy Jou, “Understanding Democracy: Data from Unlikely Places,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 4 (2007): 142–56, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2j74b860.
8. Dalton, Shin, and Jou, “Understanding Democracy.”
9. United Nations, “About Democracy and Human Rights,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed September 10, 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/about-democracy-and-human-rights.
10. “Legal equality, political freedom and rule of law are often identified by commentators as foundational characteristics for a well-functioning democracy.” See “Democracy,” Wikipedia.
11. Freedom House, “Principles for Safeguarding US Democracy,” October 26, 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/article/principles-safeguarding-us-democracy.
12. United Nations, “Democracy,” accessed September 10, 2025, https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/democracy.
13. Council of Europe, “Democracy.”
14. Council of Europe, “12 Principles of Good Democratic Governance,” accessed September 10, 2025, https://www.coe.int/en/web/centre-of-expertise-for-multilevel-governance/12-principles.
15. “Democracy,” Wikipedia.
16. Council of Europe, “Democracy.”
17. Council of Europe, “12 Principles.”
18. Mark P. Lagon, “Promoting Democracy: The Core of the Bipartisan Consensus in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Florida Journal of International Law 27, no. 3 (2015): 521–28, https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1382&context=fjil.
19. European Union External Action, “Democracy, Human Rights and Civil Society,” Delegation of the European Union to Panama, accessed September 10, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/panama/democracy-human-rights-and-civil-society_en.
20. Council of Europe, “12 Principles.”
21. Library of Parliament Canada, “Measuring Democracy,” Publication No. 2024-03-E, March 18, 2024, https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/202403E.
22. V-Dem Institute, “Democracy Reports,” accessed September 10, 2025, https://www.v-dem.net/.
23. Freedom House, “Our History,” accessed September 10, 2025, https://freedomhouse.org/about-us/our-history.
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