For many of us these these concerning times as it seems democratic norms and values are under increasing threat. The data bears this out in quite stark terms. So, I offer the following as a contribution to raising awareness as the truth of the matter is, that once it slips away, reinstating democracy is far harder than maintaining it in the first place. I have provided links in the text to the original reports cited in my research. This is one of two essays that I have produced on the subject of democracy, approaching the subject from slightly different angles. The other essay is Democracy in the Balance: A 21st-Century Audit- Kevin Parker- Site Publisher
Audio overview of the article
Introduction: Diagnosing the Threats and Forging a Path to Renewal
The foundational principles of democratic governance are facing their most significant and sustained challenge in generations. Across the globe, a confluence of rising authoritarianism, systematic political repression, and the deliberate erosion of civil liberties has created a gathering storm that threatens the very architecture of free societies. This is not a fleeting political season or a localized phenomenon; it is a systemic, multi-decade trend confirmed by the world’s most rigorous and respected democracy-tracking organizations. The data paints an unambiguous picture of a world in democratic recession, a slow but persistent retreat from the ideals of liberty, accountability, and self-governance.
The empirical evidence for this decline is overwhelming and serves as the starting point for any serious analysis. According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2025 report (download a copy here), global freedom has now declined for 19 consecutive years. In 2024 alone, 60 countries experienced a deterioration in their political rights and civil liberties, while only 34 registered improvements.¹ This prolonged backsliding affects more than 40 percent of the global population, signaling a widespread and deeply rooted crisis.² The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, using a population-weighted methodology, offers an even starker assessment. Its Democracy Report 2024 concludes that the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen has regressed to levels last seen in 1985.³ An astonishing 71 percent of the world’s population—some 5.7 billion people—now live in autocracies, a figure that has surged from 48 percent just a decade ago.⁴ For the first time in two decades, the number of closed autocracies has surpassed the number of liberal democracies, marking a grim milestone in the global balance of power.⁵
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index 2024 corroborates this narrative of decay. Its global average score fell again in 2024, a decline driven not only by the entrenchment of hardline authoritarian regimes but also by a qualitative worsening of democratic health in 130 of the 167 countries surveyed.⁶ Today, less than 7 percent of the world’s population lives in what the EIU classifies as a “full democracy,” a stark drop from over 12 percent a decade prior.⁷ This democratic malaise is characterized by declining public trust in institutions, a crisis in the functioning of government, and a systematic assault on the electoral processes that form the bedrock of democratic legitimacy.⁸
Metric | Freedom House (2025 Report) | V-Dem Institute (2024 Report) | Economist Intelligence Unit (2024 Index) |
Consecutive Years of Global Decline | 19 years¹ | ~15 years (autocratization outpacing democratization)⁹ | Consistent decline since index inception |
Population in Autocracies | Over 40% of global population affected by declines in 2024² | 71% (5.7 billion people)⁴ | 39.2% (in “authoritarian regimes”)⁷ |
Population in Democracies | Not explicitly quantified in this metric | 29% (2.3 billion people)⁴ | 45% (in “full” or “flawed” democracies)⁷ |
Number of Countries Declining vs. Improving (2024) | 60 declined, 34 improved¹ | 42 autocratizing, 18 democratizing⁹ | 83 declined, 37 improved⁶ |
Primary Drivers of Decline Identified | Election violence & manipulation, armed conflict, attacks on pluralism¹ | Autocratization (erosion of free expression, EMB autonomy), government disinformation⁹ | Worsening scores for authoritarian regimes, decline in “functioning of government,” erosion of civil liberties⁸ |
Sources | ¹ 1, ² 1 | ³ 2, ⁴ 3, ⁹ 4 | ⁶ 5, ⁷ 5, ⁸ 6 |
These statistics are more than mere numbers; they are the vital signs of a global political system under severe strain. The primary threat is no longer the dramatic military coup of the 20th century. Instead, the world is witnessing the rise of a more insidious 21st-century playbook of “autocratization” or “democratic backsliding,” a process whereby democratically elected leaders methodically dismantle the institutions of freedom from within.¹⁰ They weaponize the law, capture state institutions, manipulate elections, and silence dissent, all while claiming a democratic mandate to do so. This report seeks to dissect this modern authoritarian playbook, analyzing its core strategies and tactics as they manifest in the global assault on electoral integrity, the constriction of civic space, and the war on independent media. Following this diagnosis, it will propose an integrated framework for democratic resilience—a set of policy imperatives grounded in social justice, institutional integrity, and the revitalization of a vibrant and informed public sphere. The challenge is immense, but understanding its anatomy is the first, essential step toward forging a path to renewal.
Part I: The Anatomy of Democratic Decay

The contemporary decline of democracy is not a random series of unfortunate events but the result of a deliberate and adaptable political strategy. This section deconstructs the multifaceted nature of this threat, moving from the overarching logic of modern authoritarians to the specific tactics they employ. It examines how elections are subverted, how civil society is repressed, and how the free press is systematically targeted, revealing an interconnected assault on the core pillars of democratic life.
The New Authoritarian Playbook: A Manual for Modern Autocrats
The method by which democracies are undone has fundamentally changed. The classic imagery of tanks surrounding a presidential palace has been replaced by a far more subtle and corrosive process of internal decay, orchestrated by leaders who ascend to power through the ballot box only to subvert the very system that elected them.¹⁰ This contemporary model of “democratic backsliding” or “autocratization” is defined by its incrementalism. Would-be autocrats employ “salami tactics,” slicing away at democratic norms, rights, and institutions one piece at a time, making each individual transgression seem less alarming until the cumulative effect is the consolidation of authoritarian rule.¹¹
A central engine of this process is the rise of authoritarian populism. This political phenomenon thrives on public discontent, channeling legitimate grievances about economic inequality, social stagnation, and political representation into a powerful narrative of betrayal.¹² Populist leaders position themselves as the exclusive champions of “the people” against a corrupt and self-serving “elite.”¹³ This elite is broadly defined to include not just political opponents but also the essential, non-majoritarian institutions of a liberal democracy: an independent judiciary, a professional civil service, academic experts, and, most critically, a free press.¹⁴ By promising simple, decisive solutions to complex problems, these leaders cultivate a cult of personality that frames any check on their power as an obstruction of the popular will, thereby justifying the aggrandizement of executive authority.¹¹
This strategy involves a sophisticated weaponization of the law and state institutions. Modern authoritarians often maintain the “institutional trappings” of democracy, such as constitutions and elections, but repurpose them as instruments of control rather than constraint.¹⁵ This gives rise to what has been termed “authoritarian constitutionalism,” where legal frameworks are manipulated to legitimize and consolidate the regime’s grip on power.¹⁵ Rather than outright abolishing constitutional limits, they are reinterpreted or amended to expand executive power. Simultaneously, new repressive laws are enacted under the guise of national security or public order. Laws targeting “foreign agents,” for instance, have become a common tool to restrict the activities of independent media outlets and civil society organizations that receive international funding, effectively criminalizing their work and isolating them from global support networks.¹⁶
This playbook is not confined to a single region but has become a global template. It is visible in the significant democratic backsliding observed in large, diverse democracies like India, and it defines the entrenchment of autocracy across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, with prominent examples in Hungary, Belarus, and Russia.¹⁷, ¹⁸ The process is insidious precisely because it exploits the legitimacy conferred by democratic processes. An autocrat who wins an election, even with a narrow plurality, claims an absolute mandate to enact the “will of the people.” From this perspective, independent courts that strike down executive overreach, a critical press that exposes corruption, and opposition parties that provide a check on power are not viewed as legitimate components of a healthy democracy. Instead, they are framed as illegitimate obstacles to the popular will. The assault on these institutions is thus perversely presented not as an anti-democratic act, but as a profoundly pro-democratic one—a fulfillment of the leader’s electoral promise to the “true” people. This creates a dangerous paradox where the very mechanism of democratic selection is used to justify the systematic destruction of the broader democratic ecosystem, making the fight for freedom a struggle against a leader who claims the mantle of democracy to hollow it out from within.
Hollowing the Ballot Box: The Global Assault on Electoral Integrity
While modern authoritarians seek to dismantle the full spectrum of democratic institutions, they reserve a special focus for the electoral process itself. Elections represent both the greatest threat to their power and the greatest source of their perceived legitimacy. As a result, a global assault on electoral integrity is underway, aimed not necessarily at abolishing elections, but at hollowing them out until they are mere performances of democratic consent. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) notes that while elections remain the “single best opportunity to end democratic backsliding,” their quality is in precipitous decline.¹⁹ One in three voters globally now lives in a country where the integrity of elections has worsened.²⁰
The “menu of manipulation” available to incumbents is extensive and has grown more sophisticated over time.²¹ It begins long before election day with legislative and administrative maneuvers designed to tilt the playing field. In the United States, the practice of partisan gerrymandering, where ruling parties draw electoral districts to maximize their advantage, has become a science, creating vast swaths of “safe” seats that reduce competitiveness and increase polarization.²² This is often paired with a wave of voter suppression laws that create new hurdles to casting a ballot. These can include shortening early voting periods, restricting the use of mail-in ballots, or imposing strict voter ID requirements—measures that research consistently shows disproportionately disenfranchise racial minorities, the elderly, and low-income communities.²³, ²⁴
As an election approaches, the focus shifts to manipulating the information environment. Incumbents and their allies engage in systematic disinformation campaigns to spread falsehoods about the voting process—for example, by baselessly claiming that mail-in voting is rife with fraud—and to relentlessly attack the credibility of non-partisan election management bodies (EMBs).²², ²⁵ This strategy serves a dual purpose: it can suppress turnout among opposition supporters and, more critically, it preemptively sows public distrust in the electoral system. This manufactured doubt provides the justification for a leader to contest an unfavorable result, transforming a political loss into a narrative of theft.²⁶ This trend of refusing to concede defeat has become dangerously common, observed in nearly one in five elections held between 2020 and 2024.¹⁹ It strikes at the heart of democratic stability by eroding the norm of a peaceful transfer of power.
The threat of violence has also become a central feature of the modern electoral landscape. Freedom House’s 2025 report found that in over 40 percent of the countries that held national elections in 2024, the process was marred by violence. This included assassination attempts on candidates, physical attacks on polling places, and the violent suppression of post-election protests.²⁷
The United States, while still categorized as a “Free” country, serves as a powerful case study of these converging pressures. Its political system has been strained by intense partisan gerrymandering, relentless legal and political battles over voting access, and profound polarization surrounding the 2020 election.²² The attempts by a sitting president to overturn the results of that election, leading to a federal indictment, represent an unprecedented challenge to American democratic norms.²⁸ This is compounded by a sustained legal assault on the landmark 1965 Voting Rights Act, which has seen the Supreme Court weaken core provisions designed to protect minority voters from discriminatory practices, leaving them more vulnerable to suppression.²³
These attacks on electoral mechanics do not occur in a vacuum. They are deeply intertwined with a broader crisis in governance. The EIU identifies “functioning of government” as its lowest-scoring category globally, registering the steepest decline of any metric in 2024.⁸ This reflects a reality of political gridlock, institutional dysfunction, and a failure to deliver on the pressing economic and social needs of citizens. This lived experience of government failure breeds deep disillusionment and erodes public trust in the entire political system. When an election is held against this backdrop of cynicism, the population becomes highly susceptible to disinformation campaigns claiming the process is “rigged.” The subsequent contestation of the election result then further paralyzes the government, creating a vicious cycle. The perception of a broken government fuels distrust in elections, and the distrust in elections further breaks the government. This symbiotic relationship reveals that restoring faith in the ballot box is impossible without also restoring faith in the capacity of democratic government to function effectively and solve problems for its citizens.
The Constriction of Civic Space: Silencing Dissent from Home and Abroad
The assault on democracy extends far beyond the polling station, targeting the entire civic space where political discourse occurs, opposition is organized, and power is held to account. Authoritarian and authoritarian-leaning regimes are engaged in a systematic campaign to silence dissent and shrink the arena for independent civil society.²⁹ This constriction is achieved through a multi-pronged strategy of legal restriction, direct harassment, and, increasingly, cross-border repression.
Domestically, the primary tool is the law. Governments pass vaguely worded and restrictive legislation that gives them broad powers to interfere with the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights defenders, and community activists. In Tanzania, for example, the government has used its NGO Act to arbitrarily deregister and restrict the activities of civil society groups, particularly in the lead-up to elections.³⁰ In Belarus, the current regime, at time of writing, has all but eradicated organized political opposition, with human rights groups documenting over 1,250 political prisoners held in detention, often in life-threatening conditions.³¹ These legal frameworks are complemented by direct harassment, including arbitrary arrests, politically motivated prosecutions, and the use of surveillance to intimidate activists and their families.³⁰
This chilling effect is no longer confined by national borders. A disturbing trend identified by Freedom House is the rise of “transnational repression,” a practice where governments reach outside their territory to silence exiled dissidents, journalists, and diaspora communities.³² In 2024 alone, at least 23 governments engaged in such practices, which include assassinations, abductions and forced renditions, physical assaults, and unlawful deportations. Since 2014, researchers have documented over 1,200 separate incidents of physical transnational repression carried out by 48 different governments in 103 host countries.³² The governments of China, Turkey, and Tajikistan are among the most prolific perpetrators, systematically hunting down their critics abroad.³² This practice represents a direct assault on the sovereignty of the host nations and a flagrant violation of international laws protecting refugees and political asylum seekers.
The digital realm, once heralded as a new frontier for free expression, has been transformed into a key battleground for control. Authoritarian states have become adept at “networked authoritarianism,” using digital platforms for mass surveillance, censorship of political content, and the targeted dissemination of disinformation to maintain social stability and control.³³, ⁹ The goal of this comprehensive repression—legal, physical, and digital—is not merely to neutralize specific individuals. It is to create a pervasive climate of fear, a chilling effect that weakens the will of the broader population to express dissenting views or organize for change.³⁴ When citizens see activists imprisoned, exiles abducted, and online discourse monitored, they learn that speaking out is dangerous. This self-censorship is the ultimate victory for an authoritarian regime, as it makes society as a whole more docile and vulnerable to manipulation.³⁴
The growing practice of transnational repression reveals a fundamental insecurity at the heart of modern authoritarianism. In a globalized and interconnected world, diaspora and exile communities can leverage international media and online platforms to become powerful voices of opposition, piercing the veil of censorship and exposing the regime’s abuses to both a global audience and the population back home. This represents an intolerable threat to the autocrat’s control over the national narrative. To neutralize this threat, the regime feels compelled to export its repressive apparatus, treating the sovereign territory of other nations as an extension of its own security domain. This is more than just a human rights violation; it is an attack on the Westphalian international order, which is built on the principle of state sovereignty. It demonstrates that the logic of authoritarian control is inherently insecure and expansionist. Countering this threat therefore requires not only protecting individual dissidents but also imposing significant diplomatic, economic, and legal costs on the perpetrator states for their flagrant violations of international law and the sovereignty of other countries.
Targeting the Messenger: The War on Independent Media
In the struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, journalists and independent media outlets are on the front lines. They are the watchdogs that expose corruption, the investigators that hold power accountable, and the storytellers that provide citizens with the fact-based information necessary for self-governance. For this reason, they are a primary target in the authoritarian playbook. The war on the press is not a sideshow to democratic backsliding; it is central to it. A regime seeking to consolidate power must first discredit, intimidate, and ultimately silence the messenger.³⁵
The most brutal form of attack is physical violence. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) documented that at least 103 journalists were killed in connection with their work in 2024, the highest annual toll since the organization began its records in 1992. The war in Gaza was the primary driver of this grim statistic, but journalists also faced deadly risks in countries like Ukraine, Sudan, and Mexico.³⁶, ³⁷, ³⁸ Imprisonment is another key weapon of repression. CPJ’s 2024 prison census found 361 journalists jailed for their work globally. China, Myanmar, Belarus, and Russia consistently rank among the world’s top jailers of journalists.³⁶ These reporters are rarely convicted of recognizable crimes; instead, they are held on vague and sweeping anti-state charges, such as “spreading false news,” “inciting unrest,” or “extremism,” which are used to criminalize critical journalism.³⁶, ¹⁶

Beyond physical violence and imprisonment, journalists face a relentless onslaught of legal and digital attacks designed to paralyze their work. One of the most pernicious tactics is the use of abusive lawsuits, often known as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). These are initiated not to win on legal merits but to drain the financial resources of journalists and media outlets through years of costly litigation, creating a powerful chilling effect.³⁹ This is compounded by the growing use of sophisticated spyware by state actors to illegally surveil journalists, compromising their communications and, most critically, exposing the identities of their confidential sources.³⁹ The digital sphere has also become a toxic environment. A 2024 survey of American journalists found that one-third had been threatened with or experienced digital violence, while nearly a quarter had been subjected to sexual harassment online.³⁸
These direct attacks are amplified by a political strategy of delegitimization. Authoritarian populist leaders around the world have adopted the tactic of relentlessly branding any critical coverage as “fake news.”¹⁴, ¹¹ This is not simply a complaint about biased reporting; it is a calculated effort to destroy the very concept of objective truth and erode public trust in the institution of the press. The goal is to create a polluted information ecosystem where citizens are unable to distinguish between credible journalism and propaganda, leaving them adrift in a sea of competing narratives where only power and loyalty matter. This is an existential threat to autocrats because a free and trusted press is a natural enemy of corruption and unaccountable power.³⁵, ⁴⁰
The confluence of these threats has created a vicious cycle of media precarity and repression. The economic model that sustained journalism for a century has collapsed, leaving news organizations, particularly at the local level, financially vulnerable.⁴¹, ⁴² Authoritarian actors and kleptocrats recognize and exploit this weakness. They understand that a well-funded SLAPP lawsuit can be a death sentence for a small, independent outlet that lacks the resources for a protracted legal battle, even if the case itself is baseless. The mere threat of such a suit can be enough to induce self-censorship, causing newsrooms to shy away from risky but vital investigative work. This, in turn, leads to a less informed public and diminished accountability for the powerful, which further strengthens the position of the very actors who weaponize the legal system against the press. This dynamic demonstrates that the economic crisis in journalism and the political war on the press are not separate problems; they are deeply and dangerously intertwined. A financially weak press is an easily intimidated press. Therefore, any effective strategy to protect journalism and defend democracy must address both legal shields and economic sustainability. Media viability has become a core press freedom issue.
Part II: A Framework for Democratic Resilience
Diagnosing the anatomy of democratic decay is a necessary but insufficient task. The gravity and complexity of the threats demand an equally comprehensive and integrated response. A framework for democratic resilience must move beyond piecemeal solutions and address the systemic vulnerabilities that modern authoritarians exploit. This requires a holistic strategy that simultaneously reclaims the integrity of political representation, strengthens the institutional foundations against corruption, rebuilds the economic viability and legal protection of the free press, and fosters a more discerning and disinformation-resistant citizenry. This is a long-term project of democratic renewal, grounded in the principles of social justice and a steadfast commitment to reinforcing the pillars of a free society.
Reclaiming Representation: The Imperative for Electoral and Social Justice
At its core, the crisis of democracy is a crisis of representation. Political representation is the fundamental activity of making citizens’ voices, perspectives, and interests “present” in the halls of power and in the processes of public policy making.⁴³ When large segments of the population feel that the system is not responsive to their needs, that their votes do not matter, and that their voices are not heard, the legitimacy of the entire democratic enterprise begins to crumble. From a social justice perspective, therefore, democratic renewal must begin by ensuring that all citizens, particularly those from historically marginalized and underrepresented communities, have their right to political participation fully guaranteed and can exercise it in a meaningful way.⁴⁴, ⁴⁵
This necessitates a robust policy agenda focused on creating a new generation of voting rights and protections. The systematic erosion of these rights must be met with a determined federal and state-level response. In the United States, this means passing landmark legislation like the John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act to restore the full protections of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, particularly its provisions against racially discriminatory voting practices that have been significantly weakened by recent Supreme Court decisions.²³, ²⁴, ⁴⁶ Beyond restoring old protections, democracies must modernize voter access by establishing a high national baseline of pro-voter policies. These should include automatic voter registration (AVR), where eligible citizens are registered to vote when they interact with government agencies; same-day registration, which eliminates arbitrary deadlines that disenfranchise voters; expanded early and weekend voting to accommodate working people; and secure online registration to make the process as convenient as possible.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the integrity of the process depends on the safety of those who administer it. Stronger legal prohibitions against the intimidation, harassment, and threatening of non-partisan election workers and officials are essential to safeguard the machinery of democracy from partisan pressure.⁴⁶
However, ensuring access to the ballot is only part of the solution. The hyper-partisanship that paralyzes governance and fuels public cynicism is itself a product of flawed electoral structures. Addressing this requires a willingness to consider deeper, structural reforms to the rules of the political game. A growing body of evidence suggests that alternative voting systems can fundamentally change the incentive structures for politicians, rewarding cooperation over conflict. Ranked-choice voting (RCV), for example, allows voters to rank candidates in order of preference. This system tends to reward candidates who can build broad coalitions and appeal to voters beyond their narrow partisan base, while also mitigating the “spoiler” effect that often dooms third-party and independent candidates in “winner-take-all” systems.⁴⁷ Similarly, moving away from partisan primaries toward nonpartisan, multi-candidate primaries—where the top finishers advance to the general election regardless of party—can reduce the outsized influence of ideological extremes and empower a broader cross-section of the electorate.⁴⁷ Finally, the practice of partisan gerrymandering, which allows politicians to effectively choose their voters, can be combated by establishing independent, non-partisan commissions to draw electoral maps, a reform that has been shown to increase electoral competition and fairness.⁴⁸

These electoral reforms should not be viewed merely as technical adjustments to the voting process. They are fundamental governance reforms. The current political dysfunction in many democracies is a direct result of an electoral system that incentivizes conflict. Winner-take-all elections combined with partisan primaries often force candidates to cater to the most ideologically rigid voters in their party’s base to avoid a primary challenge. Once in office, these representatives have little political incentive to compromise with the opposing party, as doing so is often framed as betrayal by their most fervent supporters. This dynamic leads directly to legislative gridlock and a crisis in the “functioning of government.”⁸ The public observes this paralysis, concludes that democracy is incapable of solving pressing problems, and loses faith in the system, making them more susceptible to the anti-establishment appeals of populist demagogues.⁶ By changing the incentive structures for politicians, electoral reforms like RCV and nonpartisan primaries can directly attack the root causes of polarization. They create a political environment where moderation, consensus-building, and problem-solving become viable, and even necessary, paths to electoral success. In this way, electoral reform is a prerequisite for restoring effective governance and, by extension, for rebuilding public trust in the democratic project itself.
Strengthening the Foundations: Anti-Corruption as Democratic Defense
The fight against corruption is inextricably linked to the defense of democracy. Corruption is not simply a matter of illicit personal enrichment; it is a systemic acid that corrodes public trust, hollows out state institutions, and provides the financial fuel for authoritarian power grabs.⁴⁹, ⁵⁰ In many de-democratizing regimes, would-be autocrats use the proceeds of corruption to co-opt elites, finance patronage networks, and sustain their assault on democratic checks and balances.⁵⁰ Perversely, they may also weaponize “anti-corruption” campaigns as a political tool, selectively prosecuting opponents while allowing their own allies to act with impunity.⁵⁰ Recognizing corruption as a core threat to national security and democratic stability is therefore the first step toward building a resilient political system.
An effective anti-corruption strategy must be holistic, sustained, and politically astute. It cannot rely on purely technical solutions but must embrace what political scientist Michael Johnston calls “deep democratization.” This long-term approach focuses on empowering citizens, civil society, and political opposition to defend their interests and demand accountability through political means.⁵¹ It prioritizes the slow, difficult work of building the social and institutional foundations for reform: an independent and accessible justice system, robust legal protections for property rights, secure civil liberties, and a vibrant, free press that can act as a public watchdog.⁵¹, ⁵² This approach conceives of good government not just in terms of administrative efficiency, but in terms of justice and fairness.⁵¹
Because corruption is an increasingly transnational phenomenon, domestic efforts must be reinforced by strong international cooperation. This requires the full implementation of multilateral frameworks like the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which establishes comprehensive standards for prevention, criminalization, and asset recovery.⁴⁹ It also means investing in the capacity of national law enforcement agencies to conduct complex, cross-border financial investigations and building effective networks of practitioners who can share intelligence and facilitate mutual legal assistance.⁴⁹ A critical lever of international pressure is the strategy of denying safe haven. Corrupt officials and their enablers must be prevented from using the global financial system to launder their illicit wealth. This involves closing loopholes in financial regulations, such as those that allow for anonymous shell companies or opaque real estate transactions, and imposing direct consequences, such as visa restrictions and targeted sanctions, that prevent kleptocrats from traveling to, investing in, and enjoying their ill-gotten gains in democratic countries.⁴⁹, ⁵⁰
Finally, a successful strategy must be tailored to the specific political context, as the nature of the challenge differs profoundly across regime types. In consolidated democracies, anti-corruption efforts can focus on refining laws and strengthening enforcement, as there is generally broad political will and institutional support for these measures.⁵⁰ In newly democratizing regimes, the challenge is often to build the capacity of nascent institutions and support reformist leaders who may face resistance from entrenched, old-guard interests.⁵⁰ The most acute challenge lies in de-democratizing regimes, where the government itself may be the primary driver of corruption and actively hostile to genuine reform. In these contexts, a technical, capacity-building approach is not only ineffective but potentially harmful, as it risks legitimizing a regime that is weaponizing “anti-corruption” for repressive ends. The strategy must instead become overtly political: supporting and protecting the remaining pockets of institutional independence—in the judiciary, the media, or regional governments—and providing robust support to civil society, opposition parties, and investigative journalists before it is too late.⁵⁰ In full autocracies, where systemic reform is impossible, the focus must shift to long-term “deep democratization” strategies, such as fighting for modest expansions of civil liberties or tackling petty bureaucratic corruption in ways that might build public demand for broader accountability over time.⁵¹, ⁵⁰ This context-aware, politically sophisticated approach is essential for ensuring that anti-corruption efforts serve to strengthen democracy rather than inadvertently propping up the regimes that seek to destroy it.
Sustaining the Fourth Estate: Reimagining Media Viability and Protection
A free, independent, and financially viable press is an indispensable pillar of a resilient democracy. Without it, citizens are deprived of the information needed to hold their leaders accountable, corruption flourishes in the shadows, and the public square is overrun by disinformation and propaganda. The current crisis facing journalism is therefore an existential threat to democracy itself, and it must be addressed with a two-pronged strategy that tackles both the economic unsustainability of the media industry and the escalating physical and legal threats against journalists.
Innovative Funding for Independent Voices
The 20th-century business model for journalism, built on the twin pillars of print advertising and subscriptions, has been irrevocably broken by the digital revolution. The vast majority of online advertising revenue is now captured by a few large technology platforms, leaving news organizations, especially at the local level, in a state of perpetual financial crisis.⁴¹, ⁴² This market failure requires a fundamental reimagining of how public interest journalism is funded. There is no single silver bullet; the path to sustainability lies in fostering a diverse and pluralistic ecosystem of funding sources.
One of the most promising developments is the rise of “venture philanthropy” in the journalism space. Organizations like the American Journalism Project (AJP) and the national funding coalition Press Forward operate on a model of providing “catalytic” investment. They do not simply offer grants to cover reporters’ salaries; they invest in the underlying capacity of nonprofit newsrooms, helping them build the infrastructure, technology, and revenue-generating expertise needed to become self-sustaining over the long term.⁵³, ⁵⁴ This approach recognizes that philanthropy can play a crucial role in building a new, more resilient local news ecosystem.⁵⁴

On a global scale, initiatives like the International Fund for Public Interest Media (IFPIM) are mobilizing large-scale funding from a coalition of governments and private foundations to support independent media in low- and middle-income countries.⁴¹, ⁴² In these environments, where commercial models are often unviable and government influence is pervasive, such international support can be a lifeline for courageous investigative journalism and a critical bulwark against authoritarian control.⁴²
Beyond these large-scale funds, innovation is happening at the network and individual outlet level. Funders are increasingly seeing the value in supporting networks like the Solutions Journalism Network (SJN), which provide training, resources, and technical assistance to hundreds of newsrooms at once, creating a powerful multiplier effect for every dollar invested.⁵⁵ Successful modern media outlets are also moving away from a reliance on any single revenue stream, instead building a diversified model that can include reader donations and memberships, major gifts from high-net-worth individuals, foundation grants, ticketed events, and even the licensing of their intellectual property for film or television.⁴¹, ⁵⁴ This mixed-revenue approach is key to building the financial resilience needed to withstand both market fluctuations and political pressure.
A Shield for Storytellers: A Multi-Layered Protection Strategy

Financial viability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a thriving free press. Journalists must also be protected from the physical, legal, and digital attacks designed to silence them. This requires a holistic approach to safety that provides a multi-layered shield for storytellers.⁵⁶
The first layer of this shield is a robust legal framework. In the United States, this means advocating for and defending strong “shield laws” at both the state and federal levels. These laws provide journalists with a qualified privilege against being compelled by the courts to reveal their confidential sources or turn over their unpublished work materials—a protection that is essential for investigative reporting.⁵⁷, ⁵⁸ It also means upholding laws like the federal Privacy Protection Act, which requires law enforcement to use subpoenas rather than search warrants when seeking materials from newsrooms, thereby protecting them from disruptive and intimidating police raids.⁵⁸
The second layer is access to expert legal support. Independent journalists and small, nonprofit newsrooms often lack the resources to defend themselves against powerful actors who use the legal system as a weapon. Organizations that provide pro bono (free) legal services are therefore a critical piece of infrastructure for defending press freedom. Groups like the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) in the U.S., and international networks like Media Defence and the Legal Network for Journalists at Risk (LNJAR), provide essential services ranging from pre-publication review to help avoid lawsuits, to direct representation in court when journalists are sued or prosecuted.⁵⁹, ⁵⁶
The third layer is a commitment to ending the culture of impunity for crimes against journalists. Globally, the vast majority of journalist murders go unpunished. Breaking this cycle requires sustained international diplomatic pressure and genuine domestic political will to ensure that all attacks on journalists are thoroughly investigated and that the perpetrators, including the masterminds who order the attacks, are brought to justice.⁵⁶
Finally, journalists and their news organizations must be proactive in their own defense. This means adhering to rigorous journalistic standards and ethics—including meticulous fact-checking, a commitment to fairness, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest—to ensure that their work is as legally unassailable as possible.⁶⁰ It also requires a commitment to safety training and preparedness, including robust protocols for digital security (using encryption and secure communication channels to protect sources), physical safety when covering dangerous assignments, and access to psycho-social support to help reporters cope with the trauma that often accompanies their work.⁵⁹, ⁵⁶ Together, these layers of protection—legal, institutional, and personal—can help create an environment where journalists can do their vital work without fear of reprisal.

Building a Disinformation-Resistant Public: The Critical Role of Media Literacy
A resilient democracy requires more than reformed institutions and a protected press; it requires resilient citizens. In an information environment saturated with disinformation, propaganda, and algorithmically amplified outrage, the ability of the public to engage in reasoned, fact-based deliberation is under constant assault. While reactive measures like content moderation and fact-checking play a role in mitigating the worst harms, they are insufficient to address the root of the problem. A more durable, long-term defense against the corrosive effects of disinformation is to equip citizens with the critical thinking skills to navigate the complex media landscape for themselves. This is the core objective of Media and Information Literacy (MIL).⁶¹

MIL is not simply about teaching people how to spot “fake news.” It is a comprehensive set of competencies that empowers individuals to critically assess the information they encounter, understand the motives of those who create it, identify trustworthy sources, and participate creatively and ethically in the digital public sphere.⁶¹ A media-literate citizen understands the difference between a news report, an opinion piece, and sponsored content. They can recognize the techniques of persuasion and propaganda. They appreciate the role of journalistic standards and ethics in producing reliable information. And they have the digital skills to use online tools to verify claims and trace the origins of information.⁶²
To be effective, MIL cannot be a niche or supplemental subject. It must be treated as a core competency for 21st-century citizenship and integrated systematically across the educational lifecycle. This means embedding MIL principles into the curriculum from primary school through university, and extending them into adult education and lifelong learning programs.⁶¹ However, the responsibility does not lie with the education system alone. Building a media-literate society requires a coordinated, whole-of-society approach. Governments, technology companies, media organizations, libraries, and civil society groups must work in partnership to develop, fund, and amplify effective MIL initiatives. This includes creating high-quality educational resources, supporting community-based training programs, and promoting public awareness campaigns about the importance of information integrity.⁶¹, ⁶²
The stakes of this effort extend far beyond creating smarter consumers of news. Disinformation is a political weapon, often deliberately designed to exploit social divisions, stoke anger and resentment, and erode public trust in democratic institutions and in each other.¹⁴, ¹¹ A population that is unable to distinguish credible information from malicious manipulation becomes cynical, polarized, and disengaged from civic life. When a shared, fact-based reality disintegrates, public discourse ceases to be a debate over differing policies and degenerates into a tribal conflict between competing, irreconcilable worldviews. This toxic environment is fundamentally hostile to the deliberation, compromise, and mutual respect that healthy democratic participation requires. It makes the entire political system profoundly vulnerable to the divisive tactics of authoritarian populists. Investing in Media and Information Literacy is therefore a fundamental investment in the cognitive infrastructure of democracy itself. It is about restoring the essential conditions for meaningful civic discourse, thereby making the public and the entire democratic system more resilient to the challenges of the digital age.
Conclusion: Keeping the Lights On in an Era of Democratic Twilight
The evidence presented in this report paints a sobering picture of a world in the grip of a democratic recession. For nearly two decades, the tide of freedom has been receding, driven by a new generation of autocrats who have mastered a playbook of incremental decay. They leverage the legitimacy of the ballot box to hollow out electoral integrity, weaponize the law to constrict civic space, and wage a relentless war on the independent media who dare to hold them accountable. The result is a global landscape where authoritarianism is advancing, civil liberties are eroding, and the very foundations of democratic governance are under strain.
This systemic crisis demands a systemic response. The threats are deeply interconnected: electoral manipulation is enabled by a climate of disinformation; disinformation thrives in a weakened and intimidated media environment; and the media’s vulnerability is a product of both direct political repression and profound economic disruption. Piecemeal solutions, therefore, are destined to fail. The path to renewal must be equally integrated, a holistic framework that simultaneously works to: reform electoral systems to make them fairer and less polarizing; combat the corrosive influence of corruption that fuels autocracy; rebuild the economic viability of the Fourth Estate while reinforcing legal shields for journalists; and foster a more resilient, media-literate public capable of resisting manipulation.
This is not a task for governments or civil society actors working in isolation. It requires a broad and powerful coalition of democratic solidarity—a partnership that brings together governments, international organizations, philanthropists, the private sector, journalists, and, most critically, engaged citizens.¹, ⁶³ This solidarity must be practical and tangible, extending meaningful support to the human rights defenders, activists, and reporters on the front lines of this struggle, who often work at great personal risk.¹, ⁶³
While the trends are undeniably grim, the narrative of democratic decline is not one of inevitable doom. The same research that documents the backsliding also reveals moments of remarkable resilience and democratic breakthrough. Citizen-led protest movements have, in some cases, successfully reversed autocratic tides, and competitive elections continue to offer a pathway for change.⁵, ¹ These bright spots serve as a vital reminder that democracy is not a static condition but a continuous struggle. The current era is, as one observer noted, a “time of resistance” that calls for renewed vigilance, courage, and investment in the institutions and values of a free society.¹⁴ The challenge is to recognize the gravity of the moment without succumbing to despair, and to channel that urgency into the difficult, long-term work of democratic renewal. It is a fight to keep the lights of freedom on in what has become a gathering global twilight.
Notes
- Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025: The Uphill Battle to Safeguard Rights, February 26, 2025.
- Freedom House, “Violence and the repression of political opponents during elections, ongoing armed conflicts, and the spread of authoritarian practices contributed to the 19th year of declining freedom,” Freedom in the World 2025, accessed 2024.
- Staffan I. Lindberg et al., “Democracy Report 2025: Autocratization’s New Frontiers,” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, March 2025.
- Human Level, “Our key takeaway: If a country is operating in a democracy, it is easer to operate in a rights-respecting way,” V-Dem 2024 Democracy Report, March 2024.
- University of Gothenburg, “The world is becoming increasingly authoritarian – but there is hope,” News, March 2, 2023.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2024, March 5, 2025.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2024: Key Findings,” March 2025.
- Imran Khalid, “Authoritarian suppression further on the rise: EIU 2024 democracy report,” Democracy Without Borders, March 18, 2025.
- Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot, March 2024.
- Wikipedia, “Authoritarianism,” accessed 2024.
- Protect Democracy, “What is authoritarianism?,” Authoritarianism Explained, accessed 2024.
- Luis Roberto Barroso, “Democracy in the Shadow: The Global Rise of Authoritarian Populism,” Harvard Kennedy School Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, accessed 2024.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2024, March 5, 2025, 29.
- Luis Roberto Barroso, “The Consequences of Authoritarian Populism,” Harvard Kennedy School Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, accessed 2024.
- Mark Tushnet, “Authoritarian Constitutionalism,” Cornell Law Review 100, no. 2 (2015): 391–461.
- Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule, February 2022.
- Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, “Democracy Report 2024: Regional Trends,” March 2024.
- Freedom House, “Democratic governance in Europe and Eurasia continues to decline,” Nations in Transit 2023, April 11, 2024.
- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), The Global State of Democracy 2024: Strengthening the Legitimacy of Elections in a Time of Radical Uncertainty, September 2024.
- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), “Top report finding: 1/8. In 2024, one in three voters live in a country where the quality of elections has declined,” The Global State of Democracy 2024, accessed 2024.
- Arturas Rozenas and Ora John Reuter, “The Menu of Manipulation,” Journal of Politics 81, no. 2 (2019): 513-528.
- Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: United States, 2024.
- ACLU, “The Voting Rights Act at 60: A Legacy in Jeopardy, A Democracy at Risk,” August 6, 2025.
- Learning for Justice, “Understanding Voter Suppression in Today’s Election Process,” accessed 2024.
- FBI, “Election Crimes and Security,” accessed 2024.
- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), The Global State of Democracy 2024, 5.
- Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025: Key Findings, February 26, 2025.
- Raul T. M. Törnqvist, “Trump’s Playbook: Electoral Manipulation in the 2020 US Presidential Election,” American Studies in Scandinavia 56, no. 1 (2024): 27–54.
- Zaha Hassan and H. A. Hellyer, Suppressing Dissent: Shrinking Civic Space, Transnational Repression and Palestine–Israel (London: Oneworld, 2024).
- OHCHR, “Tanzania: Experts call for urgent action amid crackdown on civil society ahead of elections,” Press Release, October 17, 2024.
- European Parliament, “Resolution of 22 January 2025 on the need for actions to address the continued oppression and fake elections in Belarus,” 2024/3014(RSP), January 22, 2025.
- Freedom House, “NEW DATA: Mass Incidents Mark Dramatic Year of Transnational Repression, as 23 Governments Silence Exiles,” Press Release, 2025.
- Rebecca MacKinnon, Networked Authoritarianism in China and Beyond (New America Foundation, 2011).
- Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
- National Endowment for Democracy (NED), “Challenging Authoritarian Censorship and Protecting Free Speech,” accessed 2024.
- Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “Attacks on the Press in 2024,” January 2025.
- UNESCO, “Journalists killed in 2024: a heavy death toll in conflict zones for the second year running,” December 12, 2024.
- International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), “IFJ publishes 2024 annual report on journalists and media staff killed,” 2025.
- Council of Europe, “Safety of Journalists platform 2024 report: serious concern about the use of spyware against journalists, abusive lawsuits and journalists in exile,” Press Release, March 5, 2024.
- Sara B. Hobolt, “The Fading Fourth Estate: The Economics and Politics of a Weakened Press,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (2016): 58-70.
- Transform Finance, “Investing in Equitable News and Media Projects,” July 2020.
- Fondation Hirondelle, “Financing Independent Media: A Global Challenge,” Mediation no. 9, July 2022.
- Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 8-9.
- Gianpaolo Baiocchi and Brian Palmer-Rubin, “Participation, Representation, and Social Justice: Using Participatory Governance to Transform Representative Democracy,” Polity 44, no. 4 (October 2012): 535–557.
- Progressive Alliance, “Resolution: Democracy and Social Justice for All,” May 2016.
- Brennan Center for Justice, “Voting Reform,” accessed 2024.
- Center for American Progress, “It’s Time to Talk About Electoral Reform,” October 2018.
- Jared Golden and Marie Gluesenkamp Perez, “Golden introduces bill to establish bipartisan electoral reform select committee,” Press Release, January 7, 2025.
- U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Combating Corruption and Promoting Good Governance,” accessed 2024.
- U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, “Rethinking Anti-Corruption in De-Democratising Regimes,” U4 Brief 2021:1.
- Michael Johnston, Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
- UNODC, “The Deep Democratization Approach,” E4J University Module Series on Anti-Corruption, Module 3, accessed 2024.
- Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas, “How news innovation funds are shaping the future of nonprofit newsrooms,” March 31, 2025.
- Sarabeth Berman, quoted in “How news innovation funds are shaping the future of nonprofit newsrooms,” Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas, March 31, 2025.
- Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy, “Funding Journalism Innovation: Case Studies,” accessed 2024.
- Free Press Unlimited, “Safety of Journalists,” accessed 2024.
- Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, “The Reporter’s Privilege,” accessed 2024.
- EBSCO, “News source protection,” Research Starters, accessed 2024.
- Democracy Toolkit, “Get Legal Support,” accessed 2024.
- FRONTLINE, “Journalistic Guidelines,” PBS, accessed 2024.
- European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), “The Importance of Media Literacy in Countering Disinformation,” accessed 2024.
- UNESCO, “Action Plan on Combatting Disinformation and Misinformation through Media and Information Literacy (MIL),” 2023.
- Freedom House, “Policy Recommendations,” Freedom in the World 2025, February 26, 2025.
Bibliography
ACLU. “The Voting Rights Act at 60: A Legacy in Jeopardy, A Democracy at Risk.” August 6, 2025. https://www.aclu.org/news/voting-rights/the-voting-rights-act-at-60-a-legacy-in-jeopardy-a-democracy-at-risk.
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo, and Brian Palmer-Rubin. “Participation, Representation, and Social Justice: Using Participatory Governance to Transform Representative Democracy.” Polity 44, no. 4 (October 2012): 535–557.
Barroso, Luis Roberto. “Democracy in the Shadow: The Global Rise of Authoritarian Populism.” Harvard Kennedy School Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. Accessed 2024. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr-ryan/our-work/carr-ryan-commentary/democracy-shadow-global-rise-authoritarian-populism.
Brennan Center for Justice. “Voting Reform.” Accessed 2024. https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/ensure-every-american-can-vote/voting-reform.
Center for American Progress. “It’s Time to Talk About Electoral Reform.” October 2018. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/its-time-to-talk-about-electoral-reform/.
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). “Attacks on the Press in 2024.” January 2025. https://cpj.org/2025/01/attacks-on-the-press-in-2024/.
Council of Europe. “Safety of Journalists platform 2024 report: serious concern about the use of spyware against journalists, abusive lawsuits and journalists in exile.” Press Release, March 5, 2024. https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/safety-of-journalists-platform-2024-report-serious-concern-about-the-use-of-spyware-against-journalists-abusive-lawsuits-and-journalists-in-exile.
Democracy Toolkit. “Get Legal Support.” Accessed 2024. https://democracytoolkit.press/resources/get-legal-support/.
EBSCO. “News source protection.” Research Starters. Accessed 2024. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/law/news-source-protection.
The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2024. March 5, 2025.
The Economist Intelligence Unit. “Democracy Index 2024: Key Findings.” March 2025.
European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). “The Importance of Media Literacy in Countering Disinformation.” Accessed 2024. https://edmo.eu/areas-of-activities/media-literacy/the-importance-of-media-literacy-in-countering-disinformation/.
European Parliament. “Resolution of 22 January 2025 on the need for actions to address the continued oppression and fake elections in Belarus.” 2024/3014(RSP). January 22, 2025. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0002_EN.html.
FBI. “Election Crimes and Security.” Accessed 2024. https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/scams-and-safety/common-frauds-and-scams/election-crimes-and-security.
Fondation Hirondelle. “Financing Independent Media: A Global Challenge.” Mediation no. 9, July 2022. https://www.hirondelle.org/wp-content/uploads/from-joomla/documents/MEDIATION_N9_ENG_HD_FinancingZMedia.pdf.
Free Press Unlimited. “Safety of Journalists.” Accessed 2024. https://www.freepressunlimited.org/en/themes/safety-journalists.
Freedom House. “Democratic governance in Europe and Eurasia continues to decline.” Nations in Transit 2023. April 11, 2024. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2023/democratic-governance-decline.
Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule. February 2022. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule.
Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2024: United States. 2024. https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024.
Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2025: The Uphill Battle to Safeguard Rights. February 26, 2025. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2025/uphill-battle-to-safeguard-rights.
Freedom House. “NEW DATA: Mass Incidents Mark Dramatic Year of Transnational Repression, as 23 Governments Silence Exiles.” Press Release, 2025. https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-data-mass-incidents-mark-dramatic-year-transnational-repression-23-governments-silence.
Freedom House. “Policy Recommendations.” Freedom in the World 2025. February 26, 2025. https://freedomhouse.org/.
Freedom House. “Violence and the repression of political opponents during elections, ongoing armed conflicts, and the spread of authoritarian practices contributed to the 19th year of declining freedom.” Freedom in the World 2025. Accessed 2024. https://freedomhouse.org/.
FRONTLINE. “Journalistic Guidelines.” PBS. Accessed 2024. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/about-us/journalistic-guidelines/.
Golden, Jared, and Marie Gluesenkamp Perez. “Golden introduces bill to establish bipartisan electoral reform select committee.” Press Release, January 7, 2025. https://golden.house.gov/media/press-releases/golden-introduces-bill-to-establish-bipartisan-electoral-reform-select-committee.
Hassan, Zaha, and H. A. Hellyer. Suppressing Dissent: Shrinking Civic Space, Transnational Repression and Palestine–Israel. London: Oneworld, 2024.
Hobolt, Sara B. “The Fading Fourth Estate: The Economics and Politics of a Weakened Press.” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (2016): 58-70.
Human Level. “Our key takeaway: If a country is operating in a democracy, it is easer to operate in a rights-respecting way.” V-Dem 2024 Democracy Report. March 2024. https://www.wearehumanlevel.com/content-hub/v-dem-2024-democracy-report.
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ). “IFJ publishes 2024 annual report on journalists and media staff killed.” 2025. https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/article/ifj-publishes-2024-annual-report-on-journalists-and-media-staff-killed.
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). The Global State of Democracy 2024: Strengthening the Legitimacy of Elections in a Time of Radical Uncertainty. September 2024. https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/sites/default/files/2024-09/the-global-state-of-democracy-2024-strengthening-legitimacy-elections.pdf.
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). “Top report finding: 1/8. In 2024, one in three voters live in a country where the quality of elections has declined.” The Global State of Democracy 2024. Accessed 2024. https://www.idea.int/gsod/2024/.
Johnston, Michael. Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Khalid, Imran. “Authoritarian suppression further on the rise: EIU 2024 democracy report.” Democracy Without Borders, March 18, 2025. https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/35822/authoritarian-suppression-further-on-the-rise-eiu-2024-democracy-report/.
Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. “How news innovation funds are shaping the future of nonprofit newsrooms.” March 31, 2025. https://knightcenter.utexas.edu/how-news-innovation-funds-are-shaping-the-future-of-nonprofit-newsrooms/.
Learning for Justice. “Understanding Voter Suppression in Today’s Election Process.” Accessed 2024. https://www.learningforjustice.org/.
Lindberg, Staffan I., et al. “Democracy Report 2025: Autocratization’s New Frontiers.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, March 2025.
Linz, Juan J. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
MacKinnon, Rebecca. Networked Authoritarianism in China and Beyond. New America Foundation, 2011.
National Endowment for Democracy (NED). “Challenging Authoritarian Censorship and Protecting Free Speech.” Accessed 2024. https://www.ned.org/challenging-authoritarian-censorship-and-protecting-free-speech/.
OHCHR. “Tanzania: Experts call for urgent action amid crackdown on civil society ahead of elections.” Press Release, October 17, 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/10/tanzania-experts-call-urgent-action-amid-crackdown-civil-society-ahead.
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
Progressive Alliance. “Resolution: Democracy and Social Justice for All.” May 2016. https://progressive-alliance.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Resolution-Democracy-and-Social-Justice-1.pdf.
Protect Democracy. “What is authoritarianism?.” Authoritarianism Explained. Accessed 2024. https://protectdemocracy.org/work/authoritarianism-explained/.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. “The Reporter’s Privilege.” Accessed 2024.
Rozenas, Arturas, and Ora John Reuter. “The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Politics 81, no. 2 (2019): 513-528.
Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy. “Funding Journalism Innovation: Case Studies.” Accessed 2024. https://shorensteincenter.org/funding-journalism-innovation-case-studies/.
Törnqvist, Raul T. M. “Trump’s Playbook: Electoral Manipulation in the 2020 US Presidential Election.” American Studies in Scandinavia 56, no. 1 (2024): 27–54.
Transform Finance. “Investing in Equitable News and Media Projects.” July 2020. https://www.fordfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/transform-finance-investing-in-equitable-news-and-media-projects-76.pdf.
Tushnet, Mark. “Authoritarian Constitutionalism.” Cornell Law Review 100, no. 2 (2015): 391–461.
U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. “Rethinking Anti-Corruption in De-Democratising Regimes.” U4 Brief 2021:1. https://www.u4.no/publications/rethinking-anti-corruption-in-de-democratising-regimes.pdf.
UNESCO. “Action Plan on Combatting Disinformation and Misinformation through Media and Information Literacy (MIL).” 2023. https://www.unesco.org/en/publication/action-plan-combatting-disinformation-and-misinformation-through-media-and-information-literacy-mil.
UNESCO. “Journalists killed in 2024: a heavy death toll in conflict zones for the second year running.” December 12, 2024. https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/journalists-killed-2024-heavy-death-toll-conflict-zones-second-year-running.
University of Gothenburg. “The world is becoming increasingly authoritarian – but there is hope.” News, March 2, 2023. https://www.gu.se/en/news/the-world-is-becoming-increasingly-authoritarian-but-there-is-hope.
UNODC. “The Deep Democratization Approach.” E4J University Module Series on Anti-Corruption, Module 3. Accessed 2024. https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/anti-corruption/module-3/key-issues/the-deep-democratization-approach.html.
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. “Combating Corruption and Promoting Good Governance.” Accessed 2024. https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs/combating-corruption-and-promoting-good-governance.
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute. Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot. March 2024. https://v-dem.net/documents/43/v-dem_dr2024_lowres.pdf.
Wikipedia. “Authoritarianism.” Accessed 2024. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authoritarianism.