During the late 80s to the early 90s I served as State Coordinator for People for Nuclear Disarmament (NSW) and have kept a watching brief on the state of play regarding the world’s nuclear weapons in the ensuing decades. This essay presents a compelling case for renewed vigilance and public engagement in the discourse regarding the manufacture, deployment and potential use of nuclear weapons. Kevin Parker- Site Publisher – July 2025

Listen to our six minute Deep Dive episode to get a feel for the content in the report below – Doomsday Clock at 89 Seconds_ Navigating the Second Nuclear Age and Its Hidden Costs

Abstract

This essay analyzes the global nuclear landscape, arguing that the world has entered a “Second Nuclear Age” characterized by unprecedented complexity and danger, reflected in the Doomsday Clock’s setting at 89 seconds to midnight. This heightened risk stems from a confluence of factors: a new, multipolar arms race driven by the modernization and expansion of active arsenals, particularly in China, and fueled by over $100 billion in annual global spending ; the development of destabilizing technologies, most notably dual-capable hypersonic missiles that compress decision times and blur the line between conventional and nuclear war ; and a volatile geopolitical environment defined by a “deterrence trilemma” among the United States, Russia, and China. This dynamic is exacerbated by the systemic collapse of the international arms control architecture, with foundational treaties like the NPT and New START either paralyzed or expiring without replacement.  

In response to this perilous environment, the essay concludes by exploring constructive pathways to stability. It proposes solutions within existing international frameworks, such as reinvigorating the NPT and adapting to a post-New START reality, alongside innovative risk-reduction measures including the universal adoption of No-First-Use policies and de-alerting strategic forces. Furthermore, the essay underscores the critical role of public empowerment, detailing strategies for civil society to build broad-based coalitions and leverage grassroots action to drive meaningful policy change. By synthesizing an analysis of the current threats with actionable policy recommendations and strategies for public engagement, the essay provides a comprehensive framework for navigating the Second Nuclear Age and pulling back from the brink of catastrophe.

The Second Nuclear Age: An Analysis of Global Arsenals, Geopolitics, and the Fraying Arms Control Regime- 89 Seconds to Midnight

Introduction

In January 2025, the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the hands of its iconic Doomsday Clock to 89 seconds to midnight. This marked the closest humanity has ever been to self-annihilation since the Clock’s inception in 1947, a stark signal that the world has entered a period of unprecedented danger.¹ The decision was not based on a single threat but on a grim confluence of interlocking crises: the growing risk of nuclear conflict, the escalating climate emergency, and the ominous potential of disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence and novel biological threats.⁴ In its official statement, the Board declared that despite unmistakable signs of danger, world leaders had failed to take the necessary actions to change course, leaving humanity perilously close to the precipice.² This single, symbolic act serves as a powerful framing device for understanding the contemporary global security environment. Every second of delay in reversing course, the Bulletin warned, increases the probability of global disaster.²

This report argues that the world has entered a “Second Nuclear Age,” a period that, while characterized by a smaller global nuclear arsenal than the peak of the Cold War, is paradoxically more complex and dangerous. This heightened danger stems from a toxic interplay of three transformative factors. First, the strategic landscape has shifted from a relatively stable, if terrifying, bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union to a volatile and unpredictable multipolar dynamic, primarily involving the United States, the Russian Federation, and a rapidly expanding People’s Republic of China.⁷ This creates a complex strategic geometry where the security calculations of each power directly impact the others, fueling a new arms race. Second, the emergence of disruptive technologies, most notably hypersonic weapons, threatens to upend decades of strategic stability by compressing decision times and blurring the critical line between conventional and nuclear warfare, creating a new era of profound vulnerability.¹⁰ Third, the international arms control architecture—the system of treaties and verification regimes that successfully managed Cold War risks—is in a state of systemic decay. Foundational agreements are either defunct, expiring without replacement, or under severe strain, leaving the world without established and mutually accepted guardrails against catastrophe.¹²

To deconstruct this perilous new era, this report will proceed in five sections. Section 1 provides a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessment of the world’s nuclear arsenals, detailing the inventories, trends, and financial underpinnings of the nine nuclear-armed states. Section 2 analyzes the instruments of deterrence, examining the evolving technologies and strategic doctrines that define modern nuclear strategy, from the enduring logic of the nuclear triad to the destabilizing potential of tactical and hypersonic weapons. Section 3 maps the geopolitical chessboard, exploring the nuclear postures of the major powers—the United States, Russia, and China—and the regional flashpoints that threaten to ignite a wider conflict. Section 4 diagnoses the health of the global arms control regime, investigating the crises facing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the impending demise of the New START treaty, and the normative challenge posed by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Finally, Section 5 examines the role of the “chorus of concern”—the non-state actors, from scientific bodies to civil society organizations, that monitor, critique, and seek to influence the trajectory of global nuclear policy. By synthesizing these interconnected dimensions, this report aims to provide an exhaustive framework for understanding the state of the world’s nuclear predicament and the urgent choices facing humanity at 89 seconds to midnight.

Section 1: The State of the World’s Nuclear Arsenals: A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment

To comprehend the nature of the Second Nuclear Age, one must begin with an empirical foundation: the size, composition, and trajectory of the world’s nuclear forces. While the total number of nuclear weapons has declined dramatically from its Cold War zenith, this simple fact masks a more complex and troubling reality. The era of deep post-Cold War disarmament has ended, replaced by a new, multipolar arms race characterized by the modernization of existing arsenals, the expansion of smaller stockpiles, and a staggering financial investment in the enterprise of annihilation. This section provides a definitive quantitative and qualitative assessment of the global nuclear landscape as of 2025.

1.1 The Nuclear-Armed States: An Inventory of Power

As of early 2025, nine nations are confirmed or widely believed to possess nuclear weapons. These states are the United States, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, Israel, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).¹⁵ According to comprehensive analyses by the world’s leading non-governmental monitoring organizations, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), these nine countries collectively possess a total inventory of approximately 12,241 to 12,331 nuclear warheads.¹⁷

This total figure, however, requires careful disaggregation to be strategically meaningful. A critical distinction must be made between the total inventory, which includes older, retired warheads that are awaiting dismantlement, and the more operationally significant military stockpile. This stockpile comprises all warheads assigned to military forces for potential use with delivery systems such as missiles, aircraft, and submarines. As of 2025, this global military stockpile is estimated to contain roughly 9,614 warheads.¹⁷

Within this military stockpile, a further distinction is necessary. A subset of these warheads—estimated at approximately 3,912—are considered deployed with operational forces, meaning they are placed on missiles or located at bomber bases ready for use.¹⁷ Of these deployed weapons, a core group of around 2,100 warheads belonging to the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France are kept in a state of

high operational alert, capable of being launched on very short notice.¹⁶ This high-alert posture is a legacy of the Cold War’s launch-on-warning strategies and represents the most immediate and acute nuclear risk. Recent assessments suggest that China may now also be keeping a small number of its warheads on missiles during peacetime, a significant shift in its traditionally more relaxed alert posture.¹⁶

The destructive power contained within these arsenals is difficult to overstate. The vast majority of these weapons are many times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, which had a yield of approximately 15 kilotons and resulted in the deaths of over 70,000 people instantly.¹⁵ Even a “limited” exchange involving a fraction of today’s arsenals could trigger catastrophic global climatic effects and widespread famine, leading to billions of deaths.²⁴

1.2 A Tale of Two Tiers: Legacies, Modernization, and a New Arms Race

The distribution of nuclear weapons remains profoundly unequal, a direct legacy of the Cold War’s bipolar rivalry. The United States and Russia continue to dominate the nuclear landscape, collectively possessing approximately 90% of the world’s total nuclear arsenal.¹⁶ According to 2025 estimates from SIPRI, Russia possesses a total inventory of 5,459 warheads, while the United States holds 5,177.¹⁹ These colossal arsenals place them in a tier of their own, far surpassing the holdings of the other seven nuclear-armed states, none of which are believed to require more than a few hundred weapons for their national security strategies.¹⁸

However, the most significant trend in the current nuclear environment is not the persistence of this two-tiered structure, but a fundamental reversal in the direction of arms development. For three decades following the Cold War, global nuclear inventories steadily declined. This trend has now stalled and, in some critical areas, reversed. While the overall global total of warheads continues to decrease slightly, this is happening only because the United States and Russia are slowly dismantling their large stockpiles of previously retired Cold War-era weapons.¹⁷ In stark contrast, the number of warheads in

active military stockpiles is beginning to increase globally, as several nations are actively expanding their operational forces.¹⁷

This new arms race is most evident in the actions of several key states:

• China: Beijing is engaged in the largest and most rapid nuclear modernization campaign of any of the nine nuclear states. Its arsenal has grown faster than any other country’s, adding an estimated 100 new warheads per year since 2023 to reach a total of approximately 600 warheads by early 2025.¹⁹ The U.S. Department of Defense projects that China’s stockpile could reach 1,000 operational warheads by 2030 and potentially 1,500 by 2035, a buildup that is adding significant momentum to the global arms race.¹⁷
• United Kingdom: In a major policy reversal, the UK government announced in 2021 that it would no longer pursue its previous goal of reducing its stockpile to a maximum of 180 warheads. Instead, it raised the ceiling to “no more than 260 warheads,” signaling an intent to increase the size of its arsenal for the first time since the end of the Cold War.¹⁷
• India and Pakistan: Both nations are continuing to modernize and expand their nuclear capabilities. India is believed to have slightly expanded its arsenal in 2024 and is developing new delivery systems, including “canisterized” missiles that may be capable of carrying mated warheads in peacetime.¹⁹ Pakistan is also advancing its delivery systems and fissile material production, suggesting its arsenal is likely to grow in the coming decade.¹⁶
• North Korea: Pyongyang continues to prioritize its nuclear program as a central element of its national security. SIPRI estimates that it has now assembled around 50 warheads and possesses enough fissile material for up to 40 more, while accelerating the production of new material.¹⁶

This evidence points to a clear conclusion: the era of post-Cold War disarmament is over. It has been replaced by a more complex and dangerous dynamic of selective, multipolar proliferation, driven by a combination of great-power competition and unresolved regional rivalries.

1.3 The Geography of Nuclear Risk: Declared, Undeclared, and Shared Arsenals

The physical location of nuclear weapons is as strategically significant as their number. The risk of nuclear use is not confined to the territories of the nine nuclear-armed states but extends to several other nations through the practice of nuclear sharing and forward deployment.

Within the NATO alliance, five non-nuclear member states host U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on their territory as part of a long-standing Cold War arrangement. These deployments include an estimated:

• 35 U.S. nuclear weapons in Italy ¹⁵
• 20 in Türkiye ¹⁵
• 15 in Germany ¹⁵
• 15 in the Netherlands ¹⁵
• 10-15 in Belgium ¹⁵

These deployments are a source of significant political controversy. All five host nations have refused to sign or ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), citing their commitments to NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy. Their position highlights the deep division between states under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” and the broader international community pushing for total abolition.¹⁵

In a parallel and more recent development, Russia has expanded the geographic footprint of its own nuclear forces. In 2023 and 2024, Moscow confirmed the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to the territory of its ally, Belarus.¹⁵ This move, a direct response to perceived NATO expansion and Western support for Ukraine, places Russian nuclear weapons closer to the heart of Europe and marks a significant escalation in regional tensions. Like the NATO host nations, Belarus has not joined the TPNW.¹⁵

Adding another layer of complexity is the unique status of Israel. Israel maintains a policy of deliberate ambiguity, or “nuclear opacity,” neither confirming nor denying its possession of nuclear weapons. However, it is universally understood to possess a sophisticated arsenal, estimated by both FAS and SIPRI to contain approximately 90 warheads.¹⁷ This undeclared status has profound implications for regional security, complicating non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East and serving as a key justification for Iran’s own nuclear ambitions.¹³

The concept of “undeclared” nuclear material and activities is a formal one within the international non-proliferation regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines it as nuclear material or related activities that a state is required to declare under its safeguards agreement but has failed to do so.²⁸ The IAEA’s ability to detect such undeclared activities, particularly through the enhanced verification measures of the “Additional Protocol,” is central to the global effort to prevent the clandestine development of nuclear weapons.²⁹ The cases of Iraq in the 1990s and ongoing challenges with Iran and North Korea demonstrate the persistent difficulty of verifying the completeness of state declarations and the limits of the international safeguards system.³⁰

1.4 The Political Economy of Annihilation: The $100 Billion Enterprise

The new nuclear arms race is not an abstract phenomenon; it is a massive economic enterprise fueled by staggering levels of public expenditure and private profit. According to a comprehensive 2024 report by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the nine nuclear-armed states collectively spent over $100 billion on their arsenals in that year alone. This represents a substantial 11% increase from the previous year and a 32% increase over the past five years, underscoring the accelerating financial commitment to these weapons.³²

The spending is overwhelmingly concentrated. The United States led with an expenditure of $56.8 billion, a sum greater than that of all other nuclear-armed states combined.³² China was the second-largest spender at $12.5 billion, followed by the United Kingdom at $10.4 billion.³⁴ To put this figure in perspective, the $100 billion spent on nuclear weapons in 2024 could have funded the entire annual budget of the United Nations nearly 28 times over, highlighting the immense opportunity cost at a time when global challenges like climate change and public health are desperately underfunded.³²

A crucial element of this economic engine is the role of the private sector. The ICAN report reveals that in 2024, private corporations earned at least $42.5 billion from contracts related to the production, maintenance, and modernization of nuclear weapons. The total value of ongoing nuclear weapons contracts is estimated to be at least $463 billion, with some extending for decades.³² This creates a powerful network of corporate and financial interests with a vested stake in the continuation of the nuclear arms race. These companies, in turn, invest heavily in lobbying governments to ensure favorable policies and continued funding. In the United States and France alone, these firms spent $128 million on lobbying efforts in 2024.³⁵ This dynamic reveals that the new arms race is driven not only by geopolitical competition but also by a self-perpetuating cycle of public spending and private profit, creating a formidable political and economic barrier to disarmament.

The following table provides a consolidated overview of global nuclear forces, synthesizing the latest available data to offer a clear, comparative snapshot of the arsenals that underpin this dangerous new era.

Country	Deployed Strategic Warheads	Deployed Non-Strategic Warheads	Reserve / Non-Deployed Warheads	Military Stockpile (Total)	Total Inventory (including retired)
Russia	1,718	0 (in central storage)	2,591	4,309	5,459
United States	1,770	100	1,930	3,700	5,177
China	24	0 (in central storage)	576	600	600
France	280	0	10	290	290
United Kingdom	120	0	105	225	225
Pakistan	0	0	170	170	170
India	0	0	180	180	180
Israel	0	0	90	90	90
North Korea	0	0	50	50	50
Total	~3,912	~100	~5,702	~9,614	~12,241

Data Sources: ¹⁷

Notes: Data as of early 2025, synthesized from SIPRI and FAS estimates. “Deployed” refers to warheads placed on missiles or at bomber bases. “Reserve/Non-Deployed” refers to warheads held in central storage. “Military Stockpile” includes deployed and reserve warheads. “Total Inventory” includes the military stockpile plus retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. Russian and Chinese non-strategic warheads are believed to be held in central storage and are thus counted in the “Reserve” category. Figures are estimates and may not sum perfectly due to rounding and differing methodologies.

The quantitative data reveals a story that goes far beyond mere numbers. The post-Cold War peace dividend, at least in the nuclear realm, has been fully spent. While the world is no longer staring down the barrel of 70,000 nuclear weapons as it was in 1986, the current dynamic is arguably more fraught with peril.¹⁸ The decline in total warhead numbers, driven almost exclusively by the U.S. and Russia dismantling obsolete weapons, masks the more strategically significant trend: the growth of active, modernizing military stockpiles in a wider array of countries.¹⁷ This is not a continuation of the old arms race; it is a qualitative shift. The competition is no longer solely about gross numbers but about enhancing the

strategic utility of nuclear forces through modernization, developing novel delivery systems, and expanding the geographic footprint of deployment, as seen in Belarus.²¹ This selective arms race, fueled by a complex mix of regional rivalries like that between India and Pakistan and the great-power competition among the U.S., Russia, and China, is inherently less stable and predictable than the bipolar Cold War standoff. The massive financial investments detailed by ICAN confirm that this is not a temporary fluctuation but a deliberate, long-term policy choice by the nuclear-armed states.³² This trend directly undermines the disarmament pillar of the NPT, providing potent ammunition to organizations like ICAN that argue the only viable path forward is a complete and total prohibition on these weapons.

Section 2: The Instruments of Deterrence: Evolving Technology and Doctrine

Nuclear weapons are not merely political symbols; they are complex technological systems embedded within intricate strategic doctrines. The credibility of a nation’s nuclear deterrent rests on the survivability of its forces, the flexibility of its response options, and the perceived willingness of its leaders to use them. For decades, the principles of deterrence were relatively stable, governed by the logic of the nuclear triad and the shared understanding of mutually assured destruction. Today, this stability is being eroded by the development of new technologies that challenge old assumptions and by a renewed debate over the “usability” of nuclear weapons, threatening to lower the threshold for their use in a conflict.

2.1 The Enduring Logic of the Triad: Survivability and Flexibility

The cornerstone of strategic nuclear deterrence for the major nuclear powers remains the nuclear triad, a three-pronged force structure consisting of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and air-based strategic bombers.³⁸ The fundamental purpose of the triad is to ensure a credible and survivable second-strike capability. By distributing nuclear assets across multiple platforms with different characteristics, a nation can guarantee that even if one or two legs of the triad are destroyed in a surprise attack, the remaining leg will be able to launch a devastating retaliatory strike. This assurance of retaliation is the foundation of mutually assured destruction (MAD), the doctrine that has, in theory, prevented nuclear war between major powers for over half a century.³⁹

Each leg of the triad possesses unique attributes that compensate for the vulnerabilities of the others:

• Land-Based ICBMs: The primary advantages of ICBMs, such as the U.S. Minuteman III, are their high readiness and prompt launch capability. Housed in hardened underground silos, they are kept on constant alert and can be launched within minutes of receiving an order.³⁸ Their primary weakness is their fixed location, which makes them vulnerable to a preemptive strike. This vulnerability creates what strategists call “use-them-or-lose-them” pressure in a crisis, as a leader might feel compelled to launch their ICBMs upon warning of an incoming attack, lest they be destroyed in their silos.⁴⁰
• Sea-Based SLBMs: The sea-based leg, composed of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), is widely considered the most survivable component of the triad.³⁸ SSBNs like the U.S. Ohio-class are designed for stealth, and their ability to hide in the vastness of the ocean makes them nearly impossible to track and destroy simultaneously. This guarantees an assured retaliatory capability, providing a stabilizing backstop to the entire deterrent force.⁴⁰ Each U.S. Ohio-class submarine can carry up to 20 Trident II D5 missiles, each armed with multiple warheads.⁴¹
• Air-Based Bombers: Strategic bombers, such as the U.S. B-52H Stratofortress and the B-2A Spirit, represent the most flexible leg of the triad.³⁸ They can be visibly deployed to signal resolve in a crisis and, crucially, can be recalled after takeoff, providing political leaders with options that a ballistic missile launch does not allow.⁴² They are capable of delivering a diverse payload, including air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and gravity bombs, against a wide range of targets.³⁸

The enduring relevance of the triad is underscored by the fact that it remains the central pillar of the massive, multi-trillion-dollar nuclear modernization programs currently underway in the United States, Russia, and, increasingly, China.⁴¹ The U.S. is developing the new Columbia-class SSBN, the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, and the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) to replace the Minuteman III, ensuring the viability of all three legs for decades to come.⁴⁰

2.2 The “Usability” Paradox: The Ambiguous Danger of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

While the triad is composed of strategic weapons designed for large-scale conflict, a second category of nuclear arms introduces a different and perhaps more insidious form of risk: tactical, or non-strategic, nuclear weapons (TNWs).⁴⁵ The distinction between strategic and tactical is not always precise, but it generally refers to intent and range. Strategic weapons are designed to strike an adversary’s homeland—cities, industrial centers, and command structures—to win a war. Tactical weapons, in contrast, are designed for battlefield use to win a specific engagement, often in proximity to friendly forces.⁴⁵ They can be delivered via a wide array of systems, including short-range missiles, artillery shells, torpedoes, and depth charges.²²

The central danger of TNWs lies in the “usability” paradox. Because they often have lower explosive yields than strategic weapons—ranging from a fraction of a kiloton to around 50 kilotons—their use may seem more “thinkable” or politically palatable to a military commander in a desperate battlefield situation.⁴⁵ This perception lowers the nuclear threshold, increasing the risk that a conventional conflict could escalate into a nuclear one through miscalculation. Once the nuclear taboo is broken, even with a “small” tactical weapon, controlling escalation would become extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible.⁴⁵

It is crucial to recognize that many so-called tactical weapons are immensely powerful. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima was 15 kilotons; many modern TNWs in the U.S. and Russian arsenals have yields far greater than that.²³ Furthermore, the distinction is often more about the target than the weapon itself. As some analysts argue, a low-yield weapon detonated over a nation’s capital would be a profoundly strategic act, while a very high-yield weapon used against a naval fleet at sea could be considered tactical.²³ This ambiguity led former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis to declare in 2018, “I don’t think there’s any such thing as a ‘tactical nuclear weapon.’ Any nuclear weapon used at any time is a strategic game changer”.⁴⁵

This issue is particularly salient in Europe, where a significant asymmetry exists. Russia is estimated to possess around 2,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads, compared to approximately 200 for the United States (about 100 of which are deployed in Europe).¹⁵ This disparity, coupled with Russia’s doctrine that appears to envision the limited use of nuclear weapons to “de-escalate” a conventional conflict on its own terms, is a primary driver of NATO’s nuclear planning and a major source of strategic instability.

2.3 The Game Changer: Hypersonic Weapons and the New Era of Vulnerability

If tactical weapons blur the line of nuclear use, a new class of technology threatens to erase it entirely. Hypersonic weapons, capable of flying at speeds greater than Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound), represent a paradigm-shifting military development that could fundamentally undermine the logic of deterrence that has prevailed for decades.¹⁰ The United States, Russia, and China are all aggressively pursuing these technologies, fueling a new, qualitative arms race that prioritizes speed and maneuverability over raw explosive power.¹¹

There are two main categories of hypersonic weapons:

• Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs): These are launched from a ballistic missile to a high altitude, after which they detach and glide to their target, performing unpredictable maneuvers within the atmosphere.⁴⁸ Russia’s Avangard system is a prominent example.⁴⁸
• Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs): These are powered throughout their flight by advanced air-breathing engines known as scramjets, allowing them to fly at very high speeds at low altitudes.⁴⁸ Russia’s Tsirkon (Zircon) missile is a key example of this type.⁴⁸

The strategic threat posed by these weapons is threefold and profound. First, their combination of extreme speed and unpredictable flight paths makes them exceptionally difficult for existing missile defense systems to track and intercept. They fly lower than ballistic missiles and are far more maneuverable, allowing them to evade radar detection for much of their flight and bypass established interceptor systems.¹¹ This capability effectively shatters the bedrock principles of strategic defense, rendering billions of dollars of investment in anti-missile technology potentially obsolete.

Second, this evasiveness drastically compresses warning and decision-making timelines. A defending nation might have only minutes, or even seconds, of warning before impact, creating immense pressure on leaders to make monumental decisions with incomplete information.¹¹ This dramatically increases the risk of miscalculation, accidental war, or escalation based on a false alarm.

Third, and most dangerously, is their dual-capability. Hypersonic missiles can be armed with either conventional or nuclear warheads.⁴⁸ This creates a profound and destabilizing ambiguity. When a hypersonic missile is launched, the defending state has no way of knowing what kind of warhead it carries. In a high-stakes crisis, leaders may be forced to assume the worst-case scenario—an incoming nuclear strike—and launch a nuclear retaliation of their own. This ambiguity effectively blurs the critical “firebreak” between conventional and nuclear conflict, creating a perilous pathway for unintended escalation.¹¹

The simultaneous pursuit of legacy system modernization and novel disruptive technologies creates a dangerous contradiction at the heart of modern nuclear strategy. On one hand, nations like the United States are investing hundreds of billions of dollars to modernize their nuclear triads.⁴⁰ The explicit purpose of this investment is to guarantee a survivable second-strike capability, thereby reinforcing the logic of mutually assured destruction and ensuring strategic stability.³⁹ This strategy is predicated on the idea that a successful, disarming first strike is impossible.

On the other hand, these same nations are investing heavily in hypersonic weapons.⁴⁹ The primary strategic value of hypersonics lies in their potential to serve as a

first-strike weapon. Their ability to penetrate any known defense system with little to no warning makes them ideally suited for “decapitation” strikes against political leadership or for destroying an adversary’s retaliatory forces (such as ICBMs in their silos) before they can be launched.¹¹ This technology is therefore predicated on the

possibility of a successful first strike, the very outcome that stable deterrence seeks to prevent.

This reveals a deep internal conflict in strategic planning. Major powers are simultaneously investing in two competing and mutually exclusive theories of victory. One theory, embodied by the triad, is based on the impossibility of winning a nuclear war and thus aims for stability. The other, embodied by hypersonics, is based on the potential for a technological breakthrough to enable a decisive, war-winning blow, which inherently creates instability. This strategic hedging, born of uncertainty about the future of warfare, is itself a major source of global risk. It encourages worst-case-scenario planning on all sides, fuels a qualitative arms race in both offensive and defensive technologies, and makes the entire global nuclear system more brittle and prone to catastrophic failure.

Section 3: The Geopolitical Chessboard: Great Power Competition and Nuclear Postures

Nuclear weapons do not exist in a vacuum; their purpose, doctrine, and development are inextricably linked to the geopolitical landscape. The current era is defined by the resurgence of great-power competition, a dynamic that has fundamentally reshaped the nuclear strategies of the world’s major powers. The relatively straightforward bipolar logic of the Cold War has given way to a complex and unstable triangular relationship between the United States, Russia, and China. This section analyzes the official nuclear postures of these three key actors, linking their doctrines to the broader context of their strategic rivalries and exploring the dangerous flashpoints where these tensions could ignite.

3.1 The United States: The Trilemma of Deterring Two Nuclear Peers

The foundational shift in U.S. nuclear strategy was formally articulated in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and reinforced in subsequent Department of Defense (DoD) reports. For the first time, the United States must now plan to deter two nuclear peer-competitors, Russia and China, simultaneously.⁵³ This “two-peer threat environment” represents a challenge of unprecedented complexity, fundamentally different from the bipolar structure of the Cold War. As a 2024 DoD report on nuclear employment strategy states, U.S. planning must now “account for the new deterrence challenges posed by the growth, modernization, and increasing diversity of potential adversaries’ nuclear arsenals” and be prepared to “deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously”.⁴³

This strategic shift is the primary justification for the comprehensive, multi-trillion-dollar modernization of the entire U.S. nuclear enterprise. The goal is to maintain a robust, flexible, and fully modernized nuclear triad capable of holding a diverse range of targets at risk in both the European and Indo-Pacific theaters.⁴³ The U.S. posture explicitly rejects a “minimum deterrence” or “counter-value” (city-targeting) approach. Instead, it reaffirms the need for a full spectrum of capabilities, including

counterforce options—the ability to target an adversary’s nuclear forces, command and control, and supporting infrastructure.⁴³ This is seen as essential for limiting damage to the United States and its allies should deterrence fail.

Furthermore, U.S. doctrine places a heavy emphasis on escalation management. It requires the development of credible, tailored options for responding to a limited nuclear attack or a significant non-nuclear strategic attack.⁴³ This is a direct response to Russia’s perceived “escalate-to-de-escalate” doctrine, in which Moscow might use a limited nuclear strike to halt a conventional conflict on favorable terms. The U.S. aims to convince adversaries that such a strategy would fail and would be met with a decisive and overwhelming response, thereby deterring limited nuclear use in the first place.⁴³

However, this posture has drawn criticism for not being aggressive enough. The bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, in its 2023 report, issued a stark warning that the Biden Administration’s NPR and its associated modernization program are “ill-prepared” for the challenges of the 2027-2035 timeframe. The Commission argued that the current program of record, established in a more benign era, may be insufficient and that the U.S. must “change course urgently” by considering an expansion of its deployed forces and accelerating the development of new capabilities to meet the demands of deterring two peers simultaneously.⁵³

3.2 Russia: Formalizing Coercion in Doctrine

Russia’s nuclear strategy has become a central tool of its foreign policy, particularly since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In November 2024, President Vladimir Putin signed a new executive order updating Russia’s official nuclear doctrine, the “Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence”.⁵⁵ The most significant change in the 2024 doctrine is a lowering of the declared threshold for nuclear use. While the 2020 version permitted a nuclear response to a conventional attack only when “the very existence of the state is threatened,” the new language is broader. It now allows for nuclear use in response to conventional attacks that threaten the “sovereignty or territorial integrity of Russia or Belarus”.⁵⁶

This doctrinal shift is not a radical departure from Russian behavior but rather a formalization of the coercive nuclear rhetoric that has been a hallmark of its strategy throughout the Ukraine war.⁵⁷ Moscow has repeatedly used nuclear threats as an instrument of psychological warfare, aiming to intimidate Western nations, shape their decision-making regarding military support for Ukraine, and deter direct NATO intervention.⁵⁶ Analysts assess that this doctrinal update is an attempt to reinforce what Moscow perceives as a weakened deterrent, as the West has gradually become desensitized to its repeated threats and has strategically “sidestepped” its declared red lines.⁵⁶

The 2024 doctrine explicitly states that aggression against Russia or its allies (i.e., Belarus) by a non-nuclear state with the support of a nuclear power will be considered a joint attack, qualifying as grounds for nuclear retaliation.⁵⁶ This language is clearly aimed at NATO and the United States. By creating deliberate ambiguity and expanding the range of scenarios for potential nuclear use, Russia seeks to amplify Western fears of escalation and regain the coercive leverage it believes it has lost.⁵⁶

3.3 China: The Pacing Threat and the “No First Use” Conundrum

China’s nuclear posture presents one of the most significant and complex challenges to global strategic stability. For decades, China has maintained a declared policy of “No First Use” (NFU), a pledge that it will “never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons” and will only use them in retaliation for a nuclear attack.⁵⁹ This policy was coupled with a strategy of “assured retaliation,” maintaining a “lean and effective” deterrent force just large enough to survive a first strike and inflict unacceptable damage in response.⁵⁹

However, there is a growing and profound contradiction between China’s declared policy and its rapidly expanding capabilities. The country is in the midst of an unprecedented nuclear buildup that is transforming its arsenal from a “minimum deterrent” into a force approaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia. This expansion includes:

• The construction of at least 350 new ICBM silos in its western desert.¹⁶
• The development and deployment of new solid-fuel and mobile ICBMs, such as the DF-41.⁴⁴
• The expansion of its ballistic missile submarine fleet and the introduction of the longer-range JL-3 SLBM.²⁶
• The recent assignment of an operational nuclear mission to its bombers, moving toward a full nuclear triad.²⁶
• A rapid increase in its warhead stockpile, projected to exceed 1,000 operational warheads by 2030.²⁶

This massive buildup fundamentally challenges the credibility of China’s traditional posture. A force of this size and diversity, particularly the move toward silo-based missiles kept at a higher state of readiness, is inconsistent with a purely retaliatory, second-strike strategy. It suggests a potential shift toward a more aggressive “launch-on-warning” (LOW) posture, which would allow China to launch its missiles upon detection of an incoming attack, rather than waiting to absorb the strike first.⁶⁴ While technically not a violation of NFU, a LOW posture significantly compresses decision times and increases the risk of a launch based on false warning, thereby eroding the practical stability that NFU is intended to provide.

The strategic rationale behind China’s expansion likely stems from a classic security dilemma. Beijing’s leaders may believe that U.S. advancements in missile defense, conventional precision-strike capabilities, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) threaten the survivability of their smaller deterrent force. From this perspective, a larger, more diverse, and more responsive arsenal is a necessary defensive measure to guarantee that its “assured retaliation” capability remains credible.⁶³ However, these defensive moves are perceived as deeply threatening and offensive by the United States and its allies, fueling a cycle of action and reaction that drives the new arms race.

Feature	United States	Russian Federation	People’s Republic of China
Stated Purpose	Deter strategic attacks; Assure allies; Achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails.	Deter nuclear and large-scale conventional aggression; Neutralize military risks.	Deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China.
First Use Policy	Ambiguous. Retains the option to use nuclear weapons first in “extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies.”	Conditional. Allows first use in response to conventional attacks that threaten the “sovereignty or territorial integrity of Russia or its allies.”	No First Use (NFU). Pledges to never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.
Key Strategic Concepts	Integrated Deterrence; Escalation Management; Counterforce Capability.	Strategic Deterrence; Escalate-to-De-escalate; Asymmetric Response.	Assured Retaliation; Minimum Deterrent (official policy, but capabilities are expanding).
Alert Posture	High alert for ICBMs and a portion of the SSBN fleet.	High alert for strategic forces.	Traditionally low alert (warheads stored separately), but moving toward a higher readiness / Launch-on-Warning (LOW) posture.

Data Sources: ⁴³

3.4 Regional Tinderboxes: The Enduring Risk of Proliferation

While great-power competition dominates the strategic landscape, several unresolved regional conflicts serve as dangerous flashpoints where the risk of nuclear use or further proliferation is acute.

• South Asia: The long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan remains one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear tinderboxes. Both nations are expanding and modernizing their arsenals, and periodic crises, such as the brief armed conflict in early 2025, carry the constant risk of escalating to the nuclear level.¹⁶
• Korean Peninsula: North Korea’s relentless pursuit of a larger and more sophisticated nuclear arsenal is a source of profound instability. Its development of tactical nuclear weapons and its leader’s call for a “limitless” expansion of the program have heightened security fears in South Korea and Japan, leading to discussions in Seoul about potentially developing its own nuclear deterrent.¹³
• Middle East: The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran remains a primary driver of regional and global insecurity. Iran’s continued enrichment activities, coupled with diminished IAEA oversight, have stoked fears that it is moving closer to a weapons capability.¹³ This has led to stark warnings from Israel, which has long maintained it would consider military action to prevent a nuclear Iran, and from Saudi Arabia, which has repeatedly stated that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, it will do so as well. Such a development would trigger a catastrophic cascade of proliferation, irrevocably altering the security landscape of the Middle East.¹³

The strategic dynamics of the Second Nuclear Age are defined by a dangerous feedback loop, a “deterrence trilemma” involving the U.S., Russia, and China. The actions taken by any one of these powers to enhance its own security are perceived as direct threats by the other two, creating a highly unstable, action-reaction cycle. When the U.S. formally adopts a strategy to deter two peers simultaneously, China perceives its smaller arsenal as dangerously inadequate, justifying a rapid expansion to ensure its “assured retaliation” capability remains credible.⁶³ Russia, observing both the focused U.S. posture and China’s rapid rise, and feeling its own conventional forces are inferior, responds by lowering its nuclear threshold to maintain strategic leverage and ensure its coercive threats are not dismissed.⁵⁶ This, in turn, provides validation for the initial U.S. assessment, reinforcing the perceived need for its robust modernization program and creating political pressure from bodies like the Strategic Posture Commission to potentially expand its own forces in response.⁵³

This trilemma makes stable, trilateral arms control almost impossible to achieve. Unlike the bipolar Cold War, where a reduction by one side could theoretically be matched by the other, the current geometry is intractable. Any move by the U.S. to reduce its arsenal to a level closer to China’s would be seen by Washington as dangerously insufficient for deterring Russia’s much larger arsenal. Conversely, any trilateral agreement that attempts to lock in the current numerical disparities would be fundamentally unacceptable to China, which would see it as codifying its strategic inferiority.⁶⁶ This inescapable strategic logic is the central, defining challenge of the Second Nuclear Age and serves as the primary engine of the new, multipolar arms race.

Section 4: The Fraying Fabric of Global Arms Control

For more than half a century, a complex architecture of international treaties, verification regimes, and diplomatic norms provided essential guardrails to manage the dangers of the nuclear age. This arms control regime, while imperfect, successfully slowed the arms race, increased transparency, and built confidence between adversaries. Today, that fabric is fraying to the point of collapse. The foundational treaties that governed nuclear risk are either dead, dying, or paralyzed by deep political divisions. This section assesses the health of this critical infrastructure, concluding that it is in a state of systemic crisis, leaving the world without established rules of the road at a time of rising geopolitical danger.

4.1 The Cornerstone in Crisis: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Since entering into force in 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime.¹³ With 189 states parties, it is one of the most widely adhered-to treaties in history.³⁰ The NPT is built on a “grand bargain” composed of three pillars:

1. Non-Proliferation (Pillars I & II): Non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons. The five states that possessed them at the time of the treaty’s drafting—the United States, the Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China—are recognized as nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons to other countries.³⁰
2. Peaceful Uses (Pillar III): All states parties are guaranteed the “inalienable right” to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responsible for verifying that these programs are not diverted to military ends.²⁹
3. Disarmament (Article VI): The NWS commit to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”.²⁷

Today, this grand bargain is under unprecedented strain, primarily due to the deep and growing chasm between the NWS and the NNWS over the implementation of Article VI.³¹ The NNWS, particularly those in the Non-Aligned Movement, argue with increasing frustration that the NWS are failing to meet their disarmament obligations. They point to the massive, multi-trillion-dollar nuclear modernization programs underway in the U.S., Russia, and China as clear evidence that the NWS have no genuine intention of eliminating their arsenals.²⁷

This fundamental disagreement has paralyzed the NPT’s diplomatic machinery. The treaty’s Review Conferences, held every five years to assess its health, have become forums for acrimony rather than progress. Both the 2015 and 2022 Review Conferences ended in failure, unable to produce a consensus final document due to intractable disagreements, with Russia blocking the outcome in 2022 over language related to its actions in Ukraine.¹³

The crisis of the NPT is further compounded by the erosion of security assurances. In 1994, Ukraine gave up the significant Soviet nuclear arsenal on its territory in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the UK, and the U.S. under the Budapest Memorandum. Russia’s subsequent and repeated violation of this agreement, culminating in its 2022 invasion, has delivered a devastating blow to the non-proliferation norm. It sends a chilling message to other non-nuclear states: security assurances from the great powers can be worthless, potentially incentivizing vulnerable nations to conclude that only their own nuclear deterrent can guarantee their survival.¹³

4.2 The Unraveling of Bilateral Restraint: The Impending Demise of New START

For decades, the primary vehicle for fulfilling the NPT’s disarmament obligation and managing the U.S.-Russian rivalry was a series of bilateral arms control treaties. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which entered into force in 2011, is the last remaining pillar of this bilateral architecture.¹²

The treaty places verifiable limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. Its central limits are:

• 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
• 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.
• 800 total deployed and non-deployed launchers for these systems.⁶⁷

Crucially, New START includes a robust and intrusive verification regime, which provided each side with vital insights into the other’s nuclear forces. This regime involved up to 18 on-site inspections per year, extensive data exchanges, and notifications about the movement and status of strategic weapons.⁶⁷ Since its entry into force, the two parties have conducted 328 on-site inspections and exchanged over 25,000 notifications, creating a critical degree of transparency and predictability.⁶⁷

The treaty’s status is now precarious. In February 2023, citing U.S. support for Ukraine, Russia announced its “suspension” of its participation in the treaty, halting all on-site inspections and data exchanges, effectively gutting the verification regime.¹² While Russia pledged to continue adhering to the central numerical limits, the U.S. State Department has declared it can no longer certify Russian compliance with high confidence.⁶⁶

The most pressing threat is the treaty’s looming expiration date: February 5, 2026.¹² There are no successor negotiations underway, and the deep animosity over the war in Ukraine makes the prospect of a follow-on agreement highly unlikely.¹² The consequences of its expiration would be dire. For the first time in more than 50 years, there would be no legally binding constraints on the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. This would likely unleash an unconstrained, quantitative arms race, as both sides would be free to upload additional warheads onto their existing missiles.²⁰ It would also plunge the strategic relationship into a state of complete opacity, forcing military planners on both sides to rely on worst-case assumptions about the other’s capabilities and intentions, a recipe for profound instability.¹²

4.3 The Normative Challenge: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

The paralysis of the NPT and the collapse of bilateral arms control created a diplomatic vacuum that was filled by a bold and historic initiative from the global disarmament movement. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), adopted at the United Nations in 2017 and entered into force in 2021, represents a fundamentally different approach to nuclear risk.⁶⁸ Born out of frustration with the slow pace of disarmament, the TPNW is the first legally binding international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons, placing them in the same category as other weapons of mass destruction like chemical and biological arms.⁶⁸

The treaty’s core provisions forbid states parties from engaging in any activity related to nuclear weapons, including their development, testing, production, possession, stockpiling, transfer, use, or threat of use.⁶⁸ As of late 2024, the TPNW had garnered significant international support, with 73 states parties and an additional 21 signatories, for a total of 94 states that have signed.⁶ This demonstrates a powerful consensus among the world’s non-nuclear states that these weapons are illegitimate and immoral.

However, the TPNW’s practical effectiveness is severely constrained by a critical limitation: the unified and vehement opposition of all nine nuclear-armed states and their allies under nuclear umbrellas, such as the members of NATO and countries like Japan and South Korea.¹⁵ None of these states have signed the treaty, and they have made it clear they have no intention of joining. Their position is that the TPNW is idealistic and dangerous, ignoring the complex security environment that, in their view, makes nuclear deterrence a continued necessity.⁶⁹ They argue that the treaty creates a parallel and competing legal regime that risks undermining the NPT, which they still see as the only viable framework for managing nuclear risk.⁶⁹

This creates a deep and seemingly irreconcilable schism in the global disarmament discourse. On one side are the majority of the world’s nations, who have used the TPNW to declare nuclear weapons illegal under international law. On the other side are the states that possess these weapons, who reject the treaty’s legitimacy and insist on the continued necessity of nuclear deterrence. This fundamental clash of worldviews defines the fractured state of modern arms control.

Treaty	Year Entered into Force	Core Objective	Current Status / Key Challenge	Position of Nuclear-Armed States
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)	1970	Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieve nuclear disarmament.	In crisis. Deep divisions between NWS and NNWS over disarmament (Article VI). Review Conferences have repeatedly failed to achieve consensus.	All five NPT-recognized NWS (US, Russia, UK, France, China) are parties but are accused of not fulfilling disarmament obligations. India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea are not parties.
New START Treaty	2011	Limit and reduce U.S. and Russian strategic offensive arms through verifiable limits.	Precarious. Russia “suspended” participation in 2023, halting verification. Set to expire in Feb 2026 with no successor negotiations underway.	Applies only to the U.S. and Russia. Its collapse would leave the world’s two largest arsenals unconstrained for the first time in decades.
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) Data Sources: 12	2021	Comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination.	Growing normative influence with 73 states parties. Its practical impact is limited by the complete opposition of all nuclear-armed states.	All nine nuclear-armed states and their allies vehemently oppose the treaty, refuse to sign it, and deny its legitimacy or its contribution to customary international law.

The global arms control regime is not merely facing a series of isolated challenges; it is experiencing a systemic breakdown. The crises afflicting the NPT, New START, and the TPNW are not independent but are locked in a negative feedback loop, where the failure of one framework exacerbates the problems of the others. The failure of the nuclear-weapon states to make tangible progress on disarmament under the NPT’s Article VI created the political and moral vacuum that the TPNW was designed to fill.³¹ The NNWS, deeply frustrated with the NPT’s paralysis, forged an alternative path to stigmatize and prohibit these weapons.

The impending collapse of New START, which has been the most visible and concrete demonstration of Article VI compliance by the U.S. and Russia, will remove the last piece of credible evidence that the major powers are pursuing disarmament in practice.¹² This will only deepen the frustration of the NNWS and further strengthen their conviction that the TPNW is the only viable path forward. In turn, the NWS view the TPNW as a direct assault on the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence and the NPT-based order they champion. They expend significant diplomatic capital opposing the TPNW, which further poisons the atmosphere within the NPT and makes the consensus needed to resolve its internal crises impossible to achieve.¹⁵

This vicious cycle reveals a complete collapse of the shared consensus that underpinned arms control for half a century. There is no longer a single, globally agreed-upon framework for managing nuclear risk. Instead, the world is fractured into two competing and mutually exclusive camps: the NWS-led, deterrence-based regime centered on a weakened NPT, and the NNWS-led, prohibition-based regime centered on a normatively powerful but practically limited TPNW. This fundamental schism has created a dangerous vacuum in global governance at the precise moment when geopolitical risks are reaching a boiling point.

Section 5: The Chorus of Concern: Scientific and Civil Society Voices

The discourse on nuclear weapons is not monopolized by governments. A diverse and sophisticated ecosystem of non-state actors—including scientific bodies, grassroots activist campaigns, and philanthropic foundations—plays a crucial role in monitoring risks, challenging official narratives, and advocating for alternative policies. These organizations provide an essential counterweight to state power, shaping the normative environment and holding leaders accountable for their failure to address existential threats. This section examines the influence of these key voices in the Second Nuclear Age.

5.1 The Scientists’ Verdict: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Doomsday Clock

For over 75 years, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has served as the conscience of the scientific community on nuclear issues. Its most famous creation, the Doomsday Clock, is far more than a piece of evocative symbolism; it represents a rigorous annual assessment by the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board, which includes Nobel laureates and other leading experts in nuclear physics, climate science, and international security.¹

The decision in January 2025 to set the Clock at 89 seconds to midnight—the closest to global catastrophe it has ever been—was a powerful synthesis of the multifaceted threats detailed throughout this report.¹ The Board’s statement explicitly cited the deteriorating nuclear landscape as a primary driver. This included Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and its frequent, thinly veiled nuclear threats; the expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals in China, Russia, and the United States; the erosion of the global arms control architecture with the looming expiration of New START; and the added danger posed by disruptive technologies that could accelerate the path to war.⁴

The Doomsday Clock’s power lies in its ability to distill these complex, interlocking risks into a single, easily understood metric. It serves as an authoritative, non-governmental verdict on the collective failure of world leaders to manage existential threats. By providing a clear and consistent warning, the Bulletin offers a potent counter-narrative to the often-reassuring official statements from government sources, reminding the public and policymakers alike of the persistent and growing danger.² Its call for action is a reminder that humanity cannot afford to wait for disaster to strike before fostering the international cooperation needed to reduce risk.¹

5.2 The Abolitionist Front: The Advocacy of ICAN and the Peace Movement

The anti-nuclear peace movement has been a persistent force for disarmament since the dawn of the atomic age. In the contemporary era, its most effective and influential component is the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), a global coalition of hundreds of civil society organizations.³³

ICAN’s crowning achievement was its central role in conceiving, advocating for, and shepherding the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) from a bold idea to a legally binding international agreement.⁶⁸ This success, for which ICAN was awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize, was a landmark victory for civil society diplomacy, demonstrating that a coalition of non-nuclear states and non-governmental organizations could successfully challenge the nuclear status quo and create new international law.²⁴ The campaign effectively reframed the debate around nuclear weapons, shifting the focus from strategic stability and deterrence theory to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of their use, drawing on the powerful testimony of the hibakusha (survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) and victims of nuclear testing.⁶⁸

ICAN’s advocacy continues through a variety of innovative strategies. A key element is its “Hidden Costs” campaign, which meticulously tracks and publicizes the vast sums of money spent on nuclear weapons globally.³² By revealing the more than $100 billion annual expenditure and exposing the lucrative contracts awarded to private defense corporations, ICAN reframes the issue as one of economic justice and misplaced priorities.³² This “follow the money” approach is a powerful tactic designed to de-legitimize the nuclear enterprise in the eyes of the public and taxpayers, building pressure on governments by highlighting the trade-offs between funding weapons of mass destruction and funding essential public services like healthcare and education.³² Other key campaigns include the ICAN Cities Appeal, which mobilizes municipal governments to support the TPNW, and the Parliamentary Pledge, which enlists elected officials to advocate for the treaty within their national legislatures.⁷⁴

5.3 The Pragmatic Path: The Role of Foundations like the Ploughshares Fund

Operating alongside the public-facing advocacy of ICAN is a network of philanthropic foundations that pursue a different, more targeted theory of change. Organizations like the Ploughshares Fund represent a pragmatic wing of the peace movement, focusing on influencing policy from within the expert and political communities.⁷¹

The Ploughshares Fund’s strategy is not one of mass protest but of strategic investment and targeted intervention. Its grant-making activities are designed to build a more resilient and effective “nuclear field” by:

• Funding Expert Research and Analysis: Supporting think tanks and academic centers like the Federation of American Scientists and the Arms Control Association to produce the rigorous, data-driven analysis that informs policy debates.⁷¹
• Fostering Dialogue and Diplomacy: Funding track-II diplomatic initiatives and convenings that bring together experts and former officials from rival nations, creating backchannels for communication and risk reduction when official channels are frozen.⁷¹
• Supporting Advocacy and Education: Providing resources to organizations that engage in direct advocacy with policymakers and conduct public education campaigns to build support for safer nuclear policies.⁷¹
• Building Broader Coalitions: A key recent strategy is to build partnerships with other social justice movements, particularly those focused on climate change and racial justice. By highlighting the intersecting harms of the nuclear enterprise—from the environmental damage of production sites to the disproportionate impact on indigenous and minority communities—they aim to broaden the anti-nuclear constituency and build a more powerful base for political change.⁷¹

This approach represents a long-term strategy focused on creating the intellectual and political conditions necessary for incremental, pragmatic risk-reduction measures while simultaneously fostering the transformational thinking needed to challenge the nuclear status quo over time.⁷¹

The combined efforts of these diverse non-state actors have created a sophisticated and influential “counter-ecosystem” that actively challenges the state-centric monopoly on nuclear policy. These groups are not working in isolation but form a mutually reinforcing network. The scientists at the Bulletin provide the authoritative, empirical risk assessment that sounds the alarm.² Activist campaigns like ICAN leverage that assessment to fuel a moral and legal crusade for a total ban, embodied by the TPNW, while simultaneously exposing the vested financial interests that perpetuate the status quo.³² Meanwhile, foundations like the Ploughshares Fund provide the crucial financial lifeblood for the expert community to develop pragmatic policy alternatives and for advocates to build the broad-based political coalitions needed for change.⁷³

While these organizations lack the formal power of states, their collective influence is significant. Their most profound impact may be their ability to shift the “Overton Window”—the range of policies considered politically acceptable at any given time. By successfully creating and championing the TPNW, ICAN and its allies have made a total ban on nuclear weapons a legitimate subject of international law, forcing the nuclear-armed states to constantly defend their opposition.⁶⁸ By relentlessly publicizing the $100 billion-plus annual price tag of the nuclear enterprise, they reframe the debate from one of pure national security to one of economic justice and public priorities.³² This sustained normative pressure, while not always resulting in immediate policy shifts, slowly erodes the political and moral legitimacy of the nuclear status quo. It creates the intellectual and political space for future leaders to pursue more ambitious risk-reduction and disarmament policies, making this counter-ecosystem a significant and indispensable variable in the global nuclear equation.

Conclusion: Pathways to Stability in an Era of Unprecedented Danger

The global security landscape has undergone a seismic transformation. The evidence presented throughout this report leads to an inescapable conclusion: the world has moved beyond the post-Cold War interlude and has fully entered a Second Nuclear Age. This new era is defined not by the sheer number of warheads, which remains far below the Cold War peak, but by a far more complex and volatile interplay of geopolitical competition, disruptive technology, and decaying legal norms. The result is a strategic environment that is arguably more dangerous and less predictable than the bipolar standoff that preceded it, a reality grimly reflected in the Doomsday Clock’s setting at 89 seconds to midnight.

Navigating this era of unprecedented nuclear danger requires a clear-eyed recognition of these new realities and a rejection of outdated Cold War paradigms. There is no single, simple solution. Instead, managing risk will demand a sustained, multi-pronged approach grounded in realism and an urgent sense of shared responsibility. This must include a concerted effort to re-establish and maintain open channels of diplomatic communication among the leaders of the United States, Russia, and China. In a crisis, the ability to communicate clearly and avoid miscalculation could be the difference between restraint and catastrophe. Beyond this foundational step, a new agenda for stability must be pursued, focusing on reinvigorating existing frameworks, exploring innovative solutions, and empowering a global public that feels increasingly disenfranchised by these developments.

Reinvigorating and Adapting Existing Frameworks

While the traditional arms control architecture is under severe strain, it is not entirely defunct. Creative diplomacy can adapt existing structures to the new environment.

• Revitalizing the NPT: The core of the NPT—the “grand bargain”—must be reaffirmed. Nuclear-weapon states can rebuild trust by taking concrete, verifiable steps toward their Article VI disarmament obligations. This could include unilaterally adopting policies such as No-First-Use (NFU) or de-alerting strategic forces, which would reduce immediate risks and demonstrate a commitment to lessening the role of nuclear weapons in security policy.⁷⁵ Concurrently, the international community must strengthen the non-proliferation pillar by providing the IAEA with the resources and authority needed to conduct robust verification, particularly through universal adoption of the Additional Protocol.⁷⁶
• Life After New START: With New START’s expiration imminent, the U.S. and Russia should, at a minimum, make politically binding commitments to continue exchanging data on their strategic forces and maintain a degree of transparency.⁷⁸ This could serve as a bridge to a future agreement. A follow-on treaty must be pursued, but the multipolar reality requires a more flexible approach. A hybrid model, combining a legally binding treaty on core strategic systems with separate, politically binding transparency measures for non-strategic weapons and new technologies, offers a plausible path forward.⁷⁸
• Engaging China: Bringing China into the arms control process is the central challenge of this era. Rather than insisting on a trilateral treaty that Beijing will reject, the U.S. and Russia could begin by proposing confidence-building measures. A trilateral ballistic missile and space launch notification agreement, for example, would enhance transparency and reduce the risk of misinterpretation without demanding numerical parity.⁷⁸

Innovative Solutions for a Multipolar World

The complexity of the Second Nuclear Age demands new thinking beyond traditional treaty-based arms control.

• Focus on Risk Reduction: A pragmatic shift in focus from immediate disarmament to “nuclear risk reduction” can build common ground.⁸⁰ This framework prioritizes practical steps to prevent nuclear use, whether intentional or accidental. Key proposals include:
  • Universal No-First-Use (NFU) Pledges: If all nuclear-armed states adopted an NFU policy, it would dramatically lower the risk of nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict and strengthen the norm against nuclear use.⁷⁵
  • De-alerting: Taking nuclear forces off “hair-trigger” alert would extend decision-making time in a crisis from minutes to hours or days, providing a crucial firebreak against a launch based on false warning or miscalculation.⁷⁵
  • Improved Communication: Establishing dedicated, multilateral crisis communication channels between the U.S., Russia, and China is essential for de-escalation.⁸³
• Addressing New Technologies: The arms race in hypersonic weapons and the potential for AI in nuclear command and control must be addressed. States should pursue agreements that ban nuclear-armed hypersonic missiles and establish norms of behavior for the use of AI in nuclear systems to prevent autonomous decision-making.⁷⁶

Empowering the Public to Demand Change

A sense of public powerlessness in the face of existential threats can lead to apathy, which only benefits the status quo. Empowering the global public is a critical component of driving policy change.

• Education and Demystification: Organizations like ICAN and the World Future Council play a vital role in translating complex nuclear policy into understandable issues of public spending, human rights, and environmental justice.⁷⁴ Campaigns that highlight the immense opportunity cost of the over $100 billion spent annually on nuclear weapons can mobilize public pressure by reframing the debate around shared priorities like healthcare and climate action.⁸⁴
• Building Broad-Based Coalitions: The anti-nuclear movement can amplify its influence by strengthening partnerships with other social justice movements. Highlighting the disproportionate impact of nuclear production and testing on indigenous and minority communities, for example, builds common cause with racial and environmental justice advocates.⁸⁵
• Grassroots and Legislative Action: Public empowerment is most effective when it is channeled into concrete political action. The ICAN Cities Appeal and the PNND Parliamentary Pledge provide clear pathways for citizens to engage their local and national representatives, demonstrating that support for disarmament is widespread.⁷⁴ Divestment campaigns, which pressure universities, pension funds, and banks to stop investing in companies that produce nuclear weapons, offer another powerful tool for citizens to exert economic pressure.⁷⁴
• Engaging Youth: The future of disarmament depends on engaging the next generation. Initiatives like Youth Fusion and #Youth4Disarmament are crucial for making the issue relevant to young people by framing it as a matter of social justice and by utilizing social media platforms to build a global community of advocates.⁸⁴

Ultimately, the challenge of the Second Nuclear Age is a challenge to global leadership and collective imagination. The chorus of concern from scientists, activists, and civil society serves as a constant reminder that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear use would respect no borders. In a world of interconnected threats, strategic stability is not a zero-sum game to be won or lost, but a collective necessity to be built and preserved. The hands of the Doomsday Clock are a warning, but they are also a call to action. The path away from midnight remains open, but it requires the political will to choose cooperation over confrontation, dialogue over threats, and shared security over the illusion of unilateral advantage. The time to make that choice is now.

---

Disclaimer

This essay has been co-created with Gemini AI with human input, oversight and editing. It is the readers responsibility to check that facts and figures as listed are accurate to your own satisfaction.

This essay is intended for informational purposes only. The information contained herein has been compiled from a variety of sources believed to be reliable and current at the time of publication. However, the author and publisher make no representation or warranty as to the accuracy, completeness, or currency of the information.

The geopolitical and technological landscape is subject to rapid change, and the data and analysis presented may become outdated. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own independent research and fact-checking to verify any information before relying upon it.

No responsibility or liability will be accepted by the author or publisher for any errors, omissions, or inaccuracies in this essay, nor for any loss or damage of any nature whatsoever arising from the use of, or reliance on, the information provided.

Bibliography and Web Resources

Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of references but this is not intended to be an academic paper for peer review! So please check information and facts to your satisfaction

1. “Doomsday Clock.” Wikipedia. Last modified January 28, 2025.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_Clock).
2. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “Closer than ever: It is now 89 seconds to midnight. 2025 Doomsday Clock Statement.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2025. https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/2025-statement/.
3. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. “2025 Doomsday Clock Announcement: 89 Seconds to Midnight.” Waging Peace, January 28, 2025. https://www.wagingpeace.org/2025-doomsday-clock-announcement-89-seconds-to-midnight/.
4. Dombovari, Adam. “Doomsday 2025.” Oregon Physicians for Social Responsibility, January 28, 2025. https://www.oregonpsr.org/doomsday_2025.
5. Peace Education Scotland. “Doomsday Clock 2025.” January 29, 2025. https://www.peaceeducationscotland.org/doomsday-clock-2025/.
6. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. “The ‘third nuclear age’.” University of Notre Dame, July 9, 2025. https://kroc.nd.edu/news-events/news/the-third-nuclear-age/.
7. Hoffman, David. “World appears on track for even more dangerous Cold War 2.0.” The Harvard Gazette, October 2024. https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2024/10/world-appears-on-track-for-even-more-dangerous-cold-war-2-0/.
8. Tong, Zhao. “The Revival of Nuclear Competition in an Altered Geopolitical Context: A Chinese Perspective.” Daedalus 153, no. 2 (Spring 2024). https://www.amacad.org/publication/daedalus/revival-nuclear-competition-altered-geopolitical-context-chinese-perspective.
9. Acton, James M. “Hypersonic Weapons.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/programs/nuclear-policy/hypersonic-weapons.
10. Global Security Review. “Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability?” May 5, 2025. https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-vulnerability/.
11. Drozdenko, Tara. “The Clock is Ticking on New START Expiration and a Nuclear Arms Race.” Union of Concerned Scientists, February 5, 2025. https://blog.ucs.org/tara-drozdenko/the-clock-is-ticking-on-new-start-expiration-and-a-nuclear-arms-race/.
12. Nuzum, Lydia. “Why a stalling NPT is a wake-up call for global security.” Chatham House, October 19, 2023. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/10/why-stalling-npt-wake-call-global-security.
13. Brookings Institution. “Managing risk: Nuclear weapons in the new geopolitics.” April 10, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/managing-risk-nuclear-weapons-in-the-new-geopolitics/.
14. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. “Who has nuclear weapons?” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.icanw.org/nuclear_arsenals.
15. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “Nuclear risks grow as new arms race looms, new SIPRI Yearbook out now.” Press Release, June 16, 2025. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/nuclear-risks-grow-new-arms-race-looms-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now.
16. Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. “Status of World Nuclear Forces.” Federation of American Scientists. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/.
17. Gupta, Cherry. “Top 9 global nuclear powers in 2025: India and Pakistan’s rank revealed.” The Indian Express, June 24, 2025. https://indianexpress.com/article/trending/top-10-listing/top-9-nuclear-armed-countries-in-2025-where-do-india-and-pakistan-rank-9917761/.
18. Hiroshima Prefecture. “Status of Nuclear Forces (estimated, as of January 2025).” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.pref.hiroshima.lg.jp/site/peace80-en/status-nuclear-forces.html.
19. Defence Industry Europe. “SIPRI report highlights growing nuclear threat as modernisation accelerates and arms control weakens.” June 15, 2025. https://defence-industry.eu/sipri-report-highlights-growing-nuclear-threat-as-modernisation-accelerates-and-arms-control-weakens/.
20. EU News. “Non-proliferation, SIPRI’s warning: ‘The world heading for nuclear rearmament’.” June 16, 2025. https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/06/16/non-proliferation-sipris-warning-the-world-heading-for-nuclear-rearmament/.
21. Britannica. “Nuclear weapon.” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-weapon.
22. “What are tactical nuclear weapons? An explainer.” Reddit, r/CredibleDefense, October 2022.(https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/xwf1mq/what_are_tactical_nuclear_weapons_an/).
23. “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.” Wikipedia. Last modified July 2025.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Prohibition_of_Nuclear_Weapons).
24. Abbasi, Kamran, et al. “Ending nuclear weapons, before they end us.” Pediatric Research, July 2025. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393407127_Ending_nuclear_weapons_before_they_end_us.
25. Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2024: A ‘Significant Expansion’.” Federation of American Scientists, January 2024. https://fas.org/publication/chinese-nuclear-forces-2024-a-significant-expansion/.
26. Ploughshares Canada. “Deliver or Collapse: Five Critical Challenges for an NPT under Strain.” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://ploughshares.ca/deliver-or-collapse-five-critical-challenges-for-an-npt-under-strain/.
27. U.S. Department of Energy. “Undeclared Nuclear Material and Activities.” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.aphelper.doe.gov/help/Glossary/gl-Undeclared_Nuclear_Material_and_Activities.htm.
28. International Atomic Energy Agency. “IAEA Safeguards Overview.” Accessed July 14, 2025.(https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/S1_Safeguards.pdf).
29. Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Current Issues and Challenges.” NPT Tutorial. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://tutorials.nti.org/npt-tutorial/current-issues-and-challenges/.
30. “Nuclear proliferation.” Wikipedia. Last modified July 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation.
31. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. “Global spending on nuclear weapons topped $100 billion in 2024.” June 13, 2025. https://www.icanw.org/global_spending_on_nuclear_weapons_topped_100_billion_in_2024.
32. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. “Hidden Costs: Nuclear Weapons Spending in 2024.” June 13, 2025. https://www.icanw.org/hidden_costs_2024_global_nuclear_weapons_spending.
33. The Straits Times. “Global nuclear arms spending up 11% in 2024, campaign group says.” June 14, 2025. https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/global-nuclear-arms-spending-up-11-in-2024-campaign-group-says.
34. The Defense Post. “Nuclear States Spent $100 Billion on Weapons in 2024: ICAN.” June 13, 2025. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/06/13/nuclear-states-weapons-spending/.
35. Our World in Data. “Nuclear Weapons.” Last modified February 2024. https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons.
36. Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2013.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 5 (2013): 75-81. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0096340213501363.
37. U.S. Department of Defense. “America’s Nuclear Triad.” Accessed July 14, 2025.(https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Americas-Nuclear-Triad/).
38. Britannica. “Nuclear triad.” Last modified July 1, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/topic/nuclear-triad.
39. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “The Nuclear Triad.” January 2021.(https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Nuclear-Triad.pdf).
40. U.S. Department of Defense. “Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 (Revised).” Chapter 3. Accessed July 14, 2025.(https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter3.html).
41. “Nuclear triad.” Wikipedia. Last modified July 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_triad.
42. U.S. Department of Defense. “Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States.” November 15, 2024.(https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/15/2003584623/-1/-1/1/REPORT-ON-THE-NUCLEAR-EMPLOYMENT-STRATEGY-OF-THE-UNITED-STATES.PDF).
43. Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80, no. 1 (2024): 43-51. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/.
44. Union of Concerned Scientists. “What Are Tactical Nuclear Weapons?” Last modified April 26, 2022. https://www.ucs.org/resources/tactical-nuclear-weapons.
45. “Tactical nuclear weapon.” Wikipedia. Last modified July 2025.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_nuclear_weapon).
46. “Strategic vs Operational vs Tactical Nuclear Weapons.” YouTube video. Accessed July 14, 2025.(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L82plRVfYzw).
47. Observer Research Foundation. “How hypersonic weapons are redefining warfare.” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/how-hypersonic-weapons-are-redefining-warfare.
48. Congressional Research Service. “Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.” Updated December 18, 2024.(https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf).
49. Raytheon. “Hypersonics.” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/hypersonics.
50. “Hypersonic weapon.” Wikipedia. Last modified July 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypersonic_weapon.
51. Frigoli, M. “Hypersonics, Stability and Arms Control.” British Pugwash, December 2019.(https://britishpugwash.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/M.Frigoli-Hypersonics-Stability-and-arms-control-PDF-2.pdf).
52. Payne, Keith B. “The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission’s Report: What the Biden Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review Should Have Been.” National Institute for Public Policy, February 20, 2024. https://nipp.org/information_series/keith-b-payne-the-congressional-strategic-posture-commissions-report-what-the-biden-administrations-nuclear-posture-review-should-have-been-no-577-february-20-2024/.
53. U.S. Department of Defense. “DOD Adjusts Nuclear Deterrence Strategy as Nuclear-Peer Adversaries Escalate.” November 15, 2024.(https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3975117/dod-adjusts-nuclear-deterrence-strategy-as-nuclear-peer-adversaries-escalate/).
54. “Executive Order Approving the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” President of Russia, November 19, 2024. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75598.
55. Paul, Rishi. “Bluff and Bluster: Why Putin Revised Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine.” European Leadership Network, November 2024. https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/bluff-and-bluster-why-putin-revised-russias-nuclear-doctrine/.
56. “An Unreal Pain: Russia’s New Nuclear Doctrine Delivers Headlines, But Not Change.” Stimson Center, November 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/an-unreal-pain-russias-new-nuclear-doctrine-delivers-headlines-but-not-change/.
57. “Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine Amendments: Scare Tactics or Real Shift?” United States Institute of Peace, January 2025. https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/01/russias-nuclear-doctrine-amendments-scare-tactics-or-real-shift.
58. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Nuclear Challenges: The Growing Capabilities of Strategic Competitors and Regional Rivals, 2nd ed., 2024. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Nuclear_Challenges_2024.pdf.
59. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Chinese Government Statement on the Complete Prohibition and Total Destruction of Nuclear Weapons.” May 31, 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/wjls/3604_665547/202405/t20240531_11367578.html.
60. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Position Paper on Security Assurances.” July 23, 2024. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202407/t20240723_11458631.html.
61. Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China. “China strictly follows nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons: Defense Spokesperson.” September 26, 2024.(http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16341310.html).
62. “No first use.” Wikipedia. Last modified July 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_first_use.
63. Stokes, Jacob. “Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making.” Center for a New American Security, 2024. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/assessing-chinas-nuclear-decision-making.
64. Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2024.” Federation of American Scientists, 2024. https://fas.org/publication/chinese-nuclear-forces-2024-a-significant-expansion/.
65. U.S. Department of State. “New START Treaty.” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.state.gov/new-start-treaty.
66. International Affairs. “The future of arms control: What follows the end of New START?” Australian Institute of International Affairs. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-future-of-arms-control-what-follows-the-end-of-new-start/.
67. “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.” Wikipedia. Last modified July 2025.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Prohibition_of_Nuclear_Weapons).
68. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. “Signature and ratification status.” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.icanw.org/signature_and_ratification_status.
69. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. “United States.” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.icanw.org/united_states.
70. Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor. “The status of the TPNW.” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://banmonitor.org/tpnw-status.
71. Ploughshares Fund. “What We Fund.” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://ploughshares.org/grants/what-we-fund/.
72. Ploughshares Fund. “Grants.” Accessed July 14, 2025. https://ploughshares.org/grants/.

MacArthur Foundation. “Ploughshares Fund.” Accessed July 14, 2025. [https://www.mac