Theories of State in the 21st Century: An Analysis of Classical and Emerging Frameworks

My Masters and proposed PhD thesis was focused on developing a Deep Ecological Theory of State. It never happened as I got married, and, in the twinkling of an eye, found myself as a primary co-carer of four amazing children under four and home tutoring my fine teenage son, never got back to Uni to complete the Phd. No regrets, it’s been a rich journey and am still happily married to marvelous Maddi’. It has taken nearly 30 years to get back to the topic and the world has moved on (as have our childern!). So, in this gathering up the shards of my past life in my time of monastic urban pondering I am revisiting the topic. I appreciate that this is not a subject that is going to get most dinner table conversations buzzing, but many things that actually matter don’t either! – Kevin Parker Site Publisher

A Theory of State (TOS) is a foundational concept in political philosophy, seeking to explain the origin, purpose, and source of legitimacy for the state—the unique entity that claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.¹ The question of the state is, at its core, the question of political life itself: Why does the state exist, what is its proper function, and by what right does it command obedience? For centuries, thinkers have grappled with these questions, producing grand theories that have shaped empires, revolutions, and the very structure of modern life. The contemporary concept of the state, as a political organization with centralized government and authority over a specific territory and population, owes its origins to early modern thinkers like Niccolò Machiavelli and was later codified by sociologists like Max Weber.² This model, formalized in international law through instruments like the 1933 Montevideo Convention, defines the state through four criteria: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.³

This essay proceeds from a central thesis: the classical theories that defined the 20th-century state—primarily Liberalism, Marxism, and Pluralism—are facing a profound crisis of legitimacy and relevance. Their core assumptions are being systematically dismantled by a confluence of global forces. Emerging intellectual frameworks, rooted in ecology, post-colonialism, and technology, are not merely offering new policy prescriptions; they are fundamentally challenging the bedrock principles of sovereignty, legitimacy, and authority upon which the modern state was built. This analysis will first outline the great modern theories of the state, establishing their core logic and claims. It will then turn to the major critiques and alternative models that have emerged from the post-colonial world and the pragmatic pursuit of development. Finally, it will assess the most radical contemporary challenges posed by ecological thought and the rise of artificial intelligence. The central inquiry is whether these powerful, often contradictory, new frameworks can coalesce into a coherent Theory of State for a world defined by planetary crises and digital transformation, or if they herald an era of permanent theoretical and political fragmentation.

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Section 1: The Great Modern Theories of State

The political landscape of the modern era has been dominated by a few powerful and competing visions of the state. These theories—Liberalism, Marxism, and Pluralism—provided the intellectual architecture for the great ideological struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries. They offer starkly different answers to the fundamental questions of state power, its purpose, and its relationship to the individual and society. Understanding their core tenets is essential for appreciating the novelty and disruptive potential of the emerging frameworks that now challenge them.

The Liberal State: Individualism, Rights, and Limited Government

Liberalism is a political and moral philosophy founded on the principles of individualism, liberty, consent of the governed, and equality before the law.⁴ At its heart, the liberal theory of the state is a theory about protecting and enhancing the freedom of the individual.⁵ This commitment manifests in a conception of the state whose legitimacy and function are inextricably tied to the protection of individual rights.

The intellectual origins of liberalism lie in the work of thinkers like John Locke, who argued against the divine right of kings and proposed a theory of political authority based on a social contract.⁶ For Locke, individuals possess inalienable natural rights—primarily to life, liberty, and property—that pre-exist government. People consent to form a state for the sole purpose of securing these rights more effectively than they could in a state of nature.⁷ This establishes the foundational liberal principle: the state’s legitimacy derives from the consent of the governed, and its primary purpose is the protection of individual freedom.⁸

This foundational logic gives rise to the classical liberal conception of the state as a “necessary evil,” a term famously used by Thomas Paine.⁹ Government is necessary to provide a legal framework, enforce contracts, and protect individuals from harm, but its coercive power is also a constant threat to liberty.¹⁰ Consequently, the power of the state must be strictly limited. This leads to the ideal of the “night-watchman state,” whose functions are minimal, confined to providing security and administering justice.¹¹ This ideal is institutionalized through constitutionalism, which creates what one scholar calls a “discipline of power” via mechanisms like the separation of powers and checks and balances, designed to limit the arbitrary exercise of authority.¹² Adam Smith extended this logic to the economic sphere, arguing that the state’s role should be that of an “invisible hand,” providing the legal conditions for a free market to flourish but otherwise refraining from interference.¹³

Over time, particularly in the late 19th and 20th centuries, this classical view was challenged from within the liberal tradition itself. A new wave of “modern” or “social” liberals argued that true freedom required more than just the absence of state interference. They contended that obstacles like poverty, illness, and lack of education could be just as restrictive to an individual’s potential as government coercion.¹⁴ This led to a reconceptualization of liberty, shifting from a purely “negative” concept (freedom from interference) to a “positive” one (the capacity for self-development and moral growth).¹⁵ In this view, the state is not a necessary evil but a positive agency for the public good, tasked with actively intervening in society to promote welfare, regulate the economy, and ensure a greater equality of opportunity.¹⁶ This justification for the modern welfare state represents a significant evolution in liberal thought, one that was later met with a counter-reaction from neoliberals like Friedrich Hayek and Robert Nozick, who sought to restore the minimalist state and reassert the primacy of economic liberty.¹⁷

This intellectual history reveals that the liberal tradition does not offer a single, monolithic Theory of State. Instead, it encompasses a contested and dynamic field stretched between two opposing poles: the minimalist “night-watchman” state of classical liberalism and the interventionist “welfare” state of modern liberalism. This is not merely a historical progression but a deep and enduring philosophical disagreement about the very purpose of the state. Does it exist only to protect pre-existing rights, or does it have a responsibility to actively create the conditions for a good life? This internal tension is a fundamental characteristic of the liberal TOS, making it perpetually vulnerable to critique. Arguments from the right, such as those of neoliberals, contend that the welfare state inevitably sacrifices liberty for equality. Critiques from the left, such as those of Marxists, argue that even the most robust welfare state is insufficient to address the structural injustices of capitalism. As will be explored later, ecological and post-colonial theories launch a more fundamental attack, arguing that both versions of the liberal state are built on flawed anthropocentric and Eurocentric assumptions. The dominant Western TOS is, therefore, not a stable and coherent doctrine but a site of perpetual internal conflict.

The Marxist State: Class, Conflict, and the Instrument of Power

Marxist theory offers a radical and fundamentally critical perspective on the state, viewing it not as a neutral arbiter or a product of social consensus, but as a weapon in a relentless class war. Where liberalism sees the state as a potential protector of individual rights, Marxism sees it as the primary instrument of class oppression.¹⁸ This view is rooted in the materialist conception of history, which posits that the economic “base”—the mode of production and the relations of production—determines the “superstructure” of society, which includes its political, legal, and ideological institutions.¹⁹ The state, therefore, is not an independent entity but a reflection of the underlying economic structure.

According to Marxist thinkers like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the state did not always exist. It arose at a specific point in history when society divided into irreconcilable and antagonistic classes—specifically, the bourgeoisie (the owners of the means of production) and the proletariat (the working class).²⁰ The state, Engels argued, is “a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms.”²¹ Its function is to manage this conflict, not by resolving it, but by ensuring the continued dominance of the ruling class. It is, in essence, an “institution of organised violence” that the bourgeoisie uses to protect its private property, enforce its privileges, and perpetuate the exploitation of the proletariat.²² The laws, courts, and police forces of the state do not serve the common good; they serve the interests of capital.²³

The Marxist theory of the state is therefore inherently historical and teleological. It not only describes the state’s function under capitalism but also predicts its ultimate demise. The theory advocates for a revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system by the proletariat.²⁴ This revolution would not immediately abolish the state but would instead seize its machinery. The result would be a transitional phase known as the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” in which the working class, organized as the new ruling class, would use the power of the state to “wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state.”²⁵ However, this proletarian state is seen as a temporary necessity. The ultimate goal of Marxism is the creation of a truly classless, communist society. In such a society, where the means of production are owned collectively and class antagonisms have ceased to exist, the state’s primary function—as an instrument of class oppression—becomes obsolete.²⁶ Having no further purpose, the state will, in Engels’s famous phrase, “wither away.”²⁷

The Pluralist State: A Marketplace of Competing Interests

Pluralism offers a third distinct vision of the state, one that emerged as a direct critique of both the Marxist view of the state as an instrument of a single class and the classical theory of absolute state sovereignty.²⁸ The pluralist theory of the state is most closely associated with liberal democracies and argues that political power is not concentrated in a single entity—be it the state or a ruling class—but is instead dispersed among a wide variety of competing non-governmental groups and associations.²⁹ These include trade unions, business organizations, religious groups, professional bodies, and other interest groups that constantly vie for influence.

This theory is built on a rejection of the monistic theory of sovereignty, which was central to the formation of the modern European state. Monism, articulated by thinkers like Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes and later operationalized by jurists like John Austin, holds that in any given territory, there must be a single, ultimate, and indivisible source of authority—the sovereign—whose command is law.³⁰ This theory justified the centralization of power in the nation-state and its claim to absolute authority over all other associations, both internal and external.³¹ Pluralists, such as Harold Laski and Robert MacIver, fundamentally challenged this notion. They argued that society is composed of numerous associations, each important to the lives of individuals, and that the state is but one of these associations among many.³² While the state may have a unique role in maintaining order and resolving conflicts, it does not possess an inherent or absolute claim to sovereignty.³³

In the pluralist model, the political process is envisioned as a marketplace of competing interests. Groups use their various resources—financial, organizational, electoral—to exert influence on policy-making.³⁴ The state itself is cast not as a partisan actor but as a neutral referee or “impartial arbiter” that mediates the conflicts between these groups, with its decisions reflecting the balance of power among them.³⁵ Legitimacy in a pluralist system is derived from the openness and fairness of this competitive process. As long as there are robust civil rights, such as freedom of expression and organization, and a competitive electoral system with multiple parties—a condition Robert Dahl termed “polyarchy”—no single group is likely to gain permanent dominance.³⁶

This classical debate between monistic and pluralist theories of sovereignty is far from a historical curiosity; it reveals a fundamental disagreement about the very nature of state power that predates and powerfully informs many contemporary challenges to state authority. The classical state, as described by Weber and embodied in the monistic theory, claims absolute and indivisible sovereignty. Law is simply the “command of the sovereign.” Pluralism directly attacks this premise, arguing that sovereignty is and should be divided among various social bodies, with the state acting as a crucial but not supreme coordinator. This historical debate provides the precise theoretical language needed to analyze the 21st-century reality of fragmented state authority. The immense power wielded by global technology corporations in shaping AI governance, the influence of transnational activist networks in driving climate policy, and the binding authority of international legal and financial institutions all represent a real-world “pluralization” of power that was anticipated by pluralist thinkers a century ago. Understanding pluralism is therefore not just an academic exercise; it demonstrates that the “hollowing out” of the state is not a new phenomenon but the empirical realization of a long-standing theoretical possibility.

Table 1: Comparison of Major 20th Century Theories of State

Key Attribute	Liberalism	Marxism	Pluralism	Developmental State
Origin of State	Social contract among individuals to protect natural rights. 1	Emergence from irreconcilable class conflict. 3	Evolution of society into competing interest groups requiring a mediator. 5	A deliberate project by a nationalist elite to overcome economic backwardness. 7
Primary Purpose	Protection of individual rights (life, liberty, property) and, in modern versions, promotion of individual welfare. 1	To serve as an instrument of the ruling class (bourgeoisie) to oppress the working class (proletariat). 4	To act as a neutral arbiter mediating the demands of competing interest groups. 3	To guide and promote rapid, state-led industrialization and economic development. 7
Source of Legitimacy	Consent of the governed, expressed through constitutional and democratic processes. 1	None under capitalism (it is an instrument of oppression). Legitimacy is only achieved temporarily in the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” 13	Openness of the political process and fair competition among groups (polyarchy). 5	Performance and effectiveness in delivering economic growth and national prosperity. 8
View of Individual	The rational, autonomous individual is the primary unit of political and moral value. 1	The individual is defined by their class position; class identity is primary. 16	Individuals are members of various interest groups that represent their preferences. 5	Citizens are partners in, and beneficiaries of, the national development project. 17
State-Economy Relationship	Contested: Classical view is minimal (“night-watchman”) state; Modern view is interventionist (welfare state). 1	The state is part of the “superstructure” determined by the economic “base”; it protects capitalist relations. 18	The state regulates the economic competition between interest groups but is not aligned with any single one. 11	The state actively steers the economy, using industrial policy to “create” comparative advantage. 7

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Section 2: Re-evaluating the State from the Periphery and Practice

The grand theories of Liberalism, Marxism, and Pluralism were forged primarily in the crucible of European and North American history. As the 20th century progressed, powerful critiques emerged from outside this metropolitan core, challenging the supposed universality of these models. These challenges came from two distinct but related directions: first, from post-colonial thinkers who sought to deconstruct the very foundations of the modern state as a colonial imposition, and second, from the pragmatic experience of newly independent nations that crafted a different model of statehood—the Developmental State—in their quest for economic sovereignty and national power.

The Post-Colonial Critique and Southern Theory: Deconstructing the Universal State

Post-colonial theory offers one of the most profound critiques of the modern state, arguing that the concepts of the state and sovereignty, far from being universal, are fundamentally Eurocentric constructs imposed upon the rest of the world through colonialism.³⁷ It challenges the core assumption of mainstream International Relations (IR) and political theory that the Westphalian nation-state is the natural and final form of political organization.³⁸ From a post-colonial perspective, the international system is not an anarchy of equal states, as realists might claim, but a deeply entrenched hierarchy shaped by the enduring legacies of empire, race, and class.³⁹

The Australian sociologist Raewyn Connell provides a powerful framework for this analysis with her concept of “Southern Theory.” Connell argues that mainstream social science, which is taught globally as universal theory, is in fact “Northern Theory”—a body of knowledge produced by and for the educated and affluent in the metropoles of Europe and North America.⁴⁰ In this intellectual schema, the Global South—the vast majority of the world—serves merely as a “data mine,” a source of raw material for theories constructed in the North, while the rich intellectual traditions and theoretical innovations of the periphery are systematically ignored or marginalized.⁴¹ This “grand erasure” of the South’s experience and knowledge production is not an accident but a structural feature of a global economy of knowledge that mirrors the global economy of material goods.⁴²

Applying this lens to the Theory of State reveals the colonial DNA embedded within it. The concept of sovereignty, for instance, was not achieved by post-colonial nations but was imposed on them, often through violent processes that created artificial borders and disregarded existing social and political structures.⁴³ Thinkers like Hamza Alavi have argued that this history produced a unique and often dysfunctional entity: the “overdeveloped” post-colonial state. This state inherited the powerful coercive and bureaucratic machinery of its colonial predecessor—an apparatus designed for domination—but lacked deep organic roots in its own society.⁴⁴ This makes the post-colonial state simultaneously powerful in its ability to repress its own population and weak in its capacity to drive genuine, inclusive development. It is an alien structure, suspended above the society it purports to govern.⁴⁵

This analysis suggests that post-colonial theory is not a theory of the state in the same prescriptive sense as Liberalism or Marxism. It does not offer a new, universal blueprint for how the state should be organized. Rather, it is primarily a theory of the illegitimacy of the existing state form in much of the world. While both Liberalism and Marxism operate within a European historical framework and take the nation-state as their default unit of analysis, post-colonialism attacks this very foundation. It argues that the state form itself was an integral part of the colonial project of domination and control. Therefore, from a post-colonial perspective, the central political question is not “what is the state’s proper purpose?” but “how can the state be decolonized?” The theory’s primary goal is to expose the colonial origins of state power, to challenge its claims to universality, and to create intellectual space for subaltern peoples to speak for themselves and imagine alternative political futures.⁴⁶ This makes post-colonialism a potent critical tool, but it also limits its capacity to present a single, coherent, prescriptive Theory of State. Its most vital contribution is its insistence that any future TOS must grapple with the realities of global power imbalances, colonial history, and the diversity of human political experience.

The Developmental State: Performance as Legitimacy

While post-colonial theory deconstructed the state from a critical academic perspective, a different and more pragmatic model was being forged in the policy arenas of East Asia and other parts of the developing world. The Developmental State model describes a form of state-led capitalism where the government takes an active, interventionist role in steering the economy to achieve rapid industrialization and economic growth.⁴⁷ It represents a “third way” that is conceptually positioned between the laissez-faire liberal model and the centrally-planned socialist model.⁴⁸ It embraces markets but deliberately distorts them through strategic interventions to achieve specific national objectives.⁴⁹

The key features of the Developmental State are well-documented. At its core is a strong, competent, and relatively autonomous state bureaucracy, staffed by a technocratic elite.⁵⁰ This “pilot agency,” such as Japan’s legendary Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), works in close collaboration with the private sector to identify and promote strategic industries.⁵¹ The state uses a range of powerful tools to achieve its goals, including controlling finance, providing subsidies, erecting protective tariffs, and managing the exchange rate.⁵² The goal is not to adhere to a country’s existing “comparative advantage,” as liberal economics would advise, but to actively create a new comparative advantage in higher-value, technologically advanced sectors.⁵³

The source of legitimacy for the Developmental State is fundamentally different from that of its Western counterparts. Whereas liberalism derives legitimacy from the consent of the governed and constitutional process, the Developmental State’s primary claim to authority rests on its performance.⁵⁴ Its legitimacy is rooted in its proven capacity to deliver tangible results: high rates of economic growth, rising living standards, increased national power, and a sense of collective purpose.⁵⁵ This “moral ambition to develop” provides the ideological glue that holds the developmental coalition of state bureaucrats and private capital together.⁵⁶

This model can be understood as a practical, state-centric response to the very problems of dependency and peripheralization identified by post-colonial and dependency theorists. It is a form of Southern-led realpolitik that weaponizes the state as the primary instrument for achieving economic autonomy and national power in a global system perceived as hostile and hierarchical. Dependency theory, which emerged from Latin America, argued that the global capitalist system was structured to produce a continuous flow of wealth from the “periphery” to the “core,” perpetuating underdevelopment.⁵⁷ The Developmental State model offers a direct, pragmatic answer to this diagnosis. It rejects the liberal prescription to simply open markets and accept one’s place in the global division of labor—a path seen as leading to continued dependency. Instead, it uses the concentrated power of the state to build domestic industrial capacity, nurture national champions, and compete directly with the established powers of the North. This is a fundamentally realist strategy, focused on maximizing national power and security in a competitive international environment, but pursued from the specific vantage point of a late-developing nation. This reframes the Developmental State from being merely an economic strategy into a coherent, if pragmatic, Theory of State for the Global South, where the state’s overriding purpose and its ultimate source of legitimacy is the successful navigation of global power hierarchies and the achievement of national sovereignty in both political and economic terms.

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Section 3: The Ecological Challenge: Grounding the State in Nature

The classical theories of the state, as well as their post-colonial and developmentalist critiques, share a common, often unstated, assumption: that politics is a purely human affair, played out on a passive, inert natural stage. The environment features, if at all, as a collection of resources to be managed, exploited, or distributed. A new wave of political philosophy, emerging from the growing awareness of global ecological crises, radically challenges this anthropocentric (human-centered) worldview. These ecological theories—including Ecocentrism, Deep Ecology, and Ecofeminism—propose a revolutionary shift: to ground the Theory of State not in human will, rights, or class interests, but in the biophysical realities of the planet itself.

Ecocentrism and Deep Ecology: The Radical Shift in Value

Ecocentrism represents a fundamental departure from the entire tradition of Western political thought. It is a nature-centered value system that rejects the anthropocentric premise that humans are the sole or primary bearers of moral value.⁵⁸ Instead, it asserts the intrinsic value of all living beings and the ecological systems that sustain them, a value that exists independently of their usefulness to human beings.⁵⁹ This perspective argues that humans are not separate from or superior to nature, but are one interdependent part of a larger biotic community.⁶⁰

The Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess gave this worldview a specific platform with his formulation of “Deep Ecology.”⁶¹ Naess distinguished “deep” ecology from “shallow” environmentalism, which he saw as a reformist effort to manage the environment for human benefit (e.g., cleaner air for better human health). Deep Ecology, in contrast, calls for a profound philosophical and societal transformation.⁶² Its core principles, drafted by Naess and George Sessions, include: the belief that the flourishing of human and non-human life has intrinsic value; that the richness and diversity of life forms are values in themselves; that humans have no right to reduce this diversity except to satisfy vital needs; and that this requires a substantial decrease in the human population and a radical change in our economic, technological, and ideological structures away from the pursuit of an ever-higher standard of living.⁶³

From this perspective, the purpose and legitimacy of the state are completely redefined. A “deep ecological” state would not have as its primary goal the protection of individual property, the victory of a particular class, or even the aggregation of citizen preferences. Its fundamental purpose would be to protect the integrity, stability, and beauty of the entire ecological community.⁶⁴ Legitimacy would be derived not from a social contract but from an ecological one—from the state’s effectiveness as a steward of the biosphere. This vision often leads to calls for radical political decentralization. Deep ecologists and other green theorists argue that the arbitrary borders of the modern nation-state are ecologically meaningless.⁶⁵ They propose reorganizing political life around “bioregions”—natural ecological units—which would foster local autonomy, self-reliance, and a more direct, democratic relationship between communities and their immediate environment.⁶⁶

Ecofeminism: The Politics of Care and Interconnectedness

Ecofeminism provides another powerful ecological critique of the state, but one that uniquely connects the domination of nature to the patriarchal oppression of women and other marginalized groups.⁶⁷ Coined by Françoise d’Eaubonne in 1974, the term describes a diverse movement united by the core argument that the same “logic of domination” that underpins sexism is also responsible for environmental destruction.⁶⁸ It posits that Western patriarchal culture has constructed a series of hierarchical dualisms—mind over body, reason over emotion, culture over nature, man over woman—and has associated women and nature with the devalued side of these binaries.⁶⁹ Both have been seen as passive, irrational, and in need of control and exploitation by rational, active men.⁷⁰

Ecofeminist theory seeks to dismantle these interconnected systems of oppression.⁷¹ It critiques the “masculinist” values of competition, domination, and exploitation that it sees as embedded in capitalism and the modern state, and proposes an alternative political ethic based on traditionally “feminine” values of care, nurturing, reciprocity, and cooperation.⁷² The goal is not simply to add women or environmental concerns to existing political structures, but to fundamentally transform those structures by replacing the logic of domination with an ethic of care.⁷³

This has profound implications for a Theory of State. An ecofeminist state would be one whose institutions are organized not around power and control, but around the principles of care and ecological and social justice. Legitimacy would stem from the state’s ability to sustain life-supporting networks, both human and non-human. This vision finds practical expression in concepts like “food sovereignty,” championed by grassroots movements like La Via Campesina. Food sovereignty is defined not just as access to food, but as the right of communities to control their own food systems, land, and resources in a way that is ecologically sustainable and promotes gender justice.⁷⁴ This concept directly challenges the sovereignty of both the corporate-controlled global food system and the traditional nation-state, suggesting a model of legitimacy based on the just and sustainable fulfillment of fundamental human and ecological needs.⁷⁵

These ecological theories, in their various forms, present what is arguably the most fundamental challenge to the modern conception of the state: a direct assault on the principle of Westphalian sovereignty. The modern state system, established since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, is built on the bedrock of absolute state sovereignty within a clearly defined and bounded territory.⁷⁶ This is a core, often unexamined, assumption of Liberalism, Marxism, and Pluralism. However, the central problems identified by ecological thinkers—climate change, biodiversity loss, ocean pollution—are inherently transboundary and global.⁷⁷ The “tragedy of the commons” now plays out on a planetary scale, where the atmosphere and oceans are the shared pasture.⁷⁸

This creates an inescapable contradiction: the primary unit of modern politics (the territorial state) is fundamentally mismatched with the scale of the primary existential threat (global ecological collapse). A state acting “rationally” within the Westphalian system to maximize its own short-term national interest—for example, by maximizing fossil fuel extraction—can contribute directly to collective, global ruin. Therefore, any coherent “Green State” must, by logical necessity, be a post-sovereign state, or at least possess a radically redefined understanding of sovereignty. Its legitimacy could no longer derive from its ability to exercise exclusive control over its territory, but rather from its effective and responsible participation in systems of global ecological governance.⁷⁹ This would shift the very basis of statehood from territorial control to functional stewardship within a larger, interconnected planetary system—a truly revolutionary change in political theory.⁸⁰

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Section 4: The State in Flux: Hybridity and the Algorithmic Challenge

As the 21st century unfolds, the state is being transformed not only by new philosophical critiques but also by profound changes in its practical form and the technological environment in which it operates. Two key developments are particularly salient: the rise of “hybrid” models of governance that blur the lines between traditional categories, and the emergence of a “technocentric” vision of the state, supercharged by the power of artificial intelligence (AI). These trends are not merely creating new policy challenges; they are altering the very nature of political authority and legitimacy.

Hybridity in Form and Function

The clean theoretical distinctions between democracy and autocracy, or between the public and private sectors, are becoming increasingly difficult to apply to the real world. In their place, various forms of hybridity have emerged.

One form is the “hybrid regime,” a term political scientists use to describe political systems that blend democratic and authoritarian features.⁸¹ These regimes, sometimes called “illiberal democracies” or “competitive authoritarianisms,” hold regular elections, but these contests are systematically skewed to prevent a genuine transfer of power.⁸² They maintain the facade of democratic institutions like parliaments and political parties, but civil liberties are curtailed, the judiciary is not independent, the media is controlled, and opposition is harassed.⁸³ Scholars now recognize that these are not simply states in a temporary “transition” to democracy but represent a stable, distinct regime type occupying a vast “gray zone” between the two classical poles.⁸⁴

A second, and perhaps more pervasive, form of hybridity concerns the practice of governance. Across the globe, we are witnessing the rise of “hybrid governance models” that blur the traditional boundaries between the state and society.⁸⁵ This involves a move away from hierarchical, top-down government toward more networked and collaborative arrangements. These can include formal public-private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure projects, the delegation of state functions to quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (“quangos”), and complex networks of state and non-state actors co-producing public services like security or environmental management.⁸⁶ Examples are ubiquitous and diverse, ranging from massive state-owned enterprises like China Mobile and Russia’s Gazprom that compete aggressively in global markets, to local community policing initiatives in Nairobi, where residents and police co-patrol in a system where it is impossible to tell “where the citizens’ private initiative ends and where the state policing apparatus starts.”⁸⁷ These models challenge the Weberian ideal of a clear distinction between the public and private spheres, creating a complex and often murky landscape of overlapping authority.

The Technocentric State: Governance by Algorithm?

A parallel and potentially more transformative challenge comes from the rise of a technocentric vision of the state. Technocracy, as a theory, posits that governance should be the domain of technical experts, not politicians.⁸⁸ It is a system where decisions are based on specialized knowledge, data, and scientific rationality, rather than on ideology, public opinion, or political bargaining.⁸⁹ The goal is to replace the messy and inefficient processes of politics with the efficiency and precision of engineering.⁹⁰

Artificial intelligence represents the ultimate tool for realizing this technocratic dream. AI systems, particularly large language models and machine learning algorithms, can analyze vast and complex datasets, identify patterns invisible to humans, and predict the outcomes of policy choices, promising to reduce uncertainty and optimize governance.⁹¹ This technology has the potential to transform the state’s core functions, from automating the delivery of citizen services to managing chronic diseases and improving food security.⁹² However, AI also dramatically enhances the state’s capacity for control. The same technologies can be used for mass surveillance, “predictive policing,” the creation of social credit systems, and the manipulation of democratic discourse through the spread of disinformation and “deepfakes.”⁹³ This raises the spectre of “digital authoritarianism,” a new form of rule supercharged by AI.⁹⁴

Crucially, the development and deployment of this world-changing technology are not primarily in the hands of states. They are dominated by a handful of massive technology corporations.⁹⁵ This concentration of power allows these companies to shape the future of AI and its governance, using immense financial resources for lobbying and leveraging their technical expertise to dominate standards-setting bodies.⁹⁶ This creates a dynamic where the state is often not the driver of technological change but is struggling to catch up, regulate, and assert its authority over powerful non-state actors who control the core infrastructure of the digital age.

Contested Authority in the AI Age: The Fragmentation of Evidence

The rise of AI has precipitated a fundamental crisis in how we know what is true and whose knowledge counts, a crisis that strikes at the heart of the modern state’s claim to legitimacy. An extensive analysis of AI ethics debates reveals a profound conflict over what constitutes authoritative evidence for governing these complex systems.⁹⁷ This is not a simple disagreement over facts, but a struggle between fundamentally different ways of knowing, each with its own proponents and claims to authority. Four primary types of evidence are in constant, unresolved conflict:

1. Technical Evidence: This includes performance benchmarks, accuracy rates, and statistical measures of bias produced by computer scientists and engineers. It dominates initial policy discussions with its appearance of objectivity and precision. However, this evidence is often paradoxical; impressive technical benchmarks in the lab frequently fail to predict real-world impacts, as when predictive policing algorithms prove ineffective at actually reducing crime. Technical metrics capture what is measurable, not necessarily what matters to society.⁹⁸
2. Empirical Evidence: This evidence, often generated by social scientists, serves as a crucial “reality check.” It documents the real-world consequences of AI deployment, revealing how systems interact with existing social structures to amplify inequality in ways technical assessments cannot foresee. For example, studies on facial recognition in Detroit documented not just error rates but the cascading social trauma of wrongful arrests.⁹⁹
3. Philosophical Evidence: This includes the normative frameworks that provide the ethical foundations for governance. While Western “principlism” (justice, autonomy, etc.) underpins regulations like the EU’s AI Act, it is increasingly challenged by alternative philosophies like African Ubuntu ethics or Chinese Confucianism, which prioritize different values like relationality and social harmony.¹⁰⁰ Indigenous data sovereignty principles, which reframe data as a living entity rather than a resource, offer an even more radical challenge to dominant Western models.¹⁰¹
4. Lived Experience: This is the irreplaceable evidence that comes from the testimonies of those directly affected by AI systems. The accounts of Amazon warehouse workers describing algorithmic management as an “electronic whip,” or the testimony of Robert Williams about his wrongful arrest due to a faulty facial recognition match, provide essential data on harms that quantitative metrics miss.¹⁰² Yet, this form of evidence is systematically marginalized and struggles for legitimacy in policy debates dominated by technical and economic arguments.¹⁰³

This is not a neutral academic debate; it is a power struggle. The research demonstrates that financial resources and institutional power determine which forms of evidence are deemed authoritative. Corporate lobbying heavily influences regulatory agendas, technical expertise from elite institutions is valorized over other forms of knowledge, and the perspectives of the Global South are systematically excluded from global governance forums.¹⁰⁴ The result is a profound “epistemic fragmentation” that directly undermines the modern state’s traditional source of authority.

The modern state, as conceptualized by Max Weber, bases its legitimacy on a rational-legal framework. It is supposed to be a neutral, bureaucratic apparatus that uses objective rules and evidence to govern in the public interest.¹⁰⁵ It claims a monopoly not just on violence, but on the arbitration of the facts and knowledge necessary for legitimate rule. The contested evidentiary landscape of the AI age shatters this ideal. The state is no longer the sole producer or arbiter of authoritative knowledge. Instead, it is cast as a mere mediator in a “legitimacy contest” among powerful corporations, academic disciplines, civil society groups, and grassroots movements, each armed with their own version of the truth.¹⁰⁶ It is, furthermore, a mediator that is often captured by the very corporate interests it is supposed to regulate.¹⁰⁷ When the state cannot definitively say what is true or what evidence matters, its claim to make rational, legitimate decisions is hollowed out. Power shifts from the formal institutions of government to those who control the new epistemic infrastructure—the data, the algorithms, and the platforms. This suggests that a future “AI State” may not be a state in the Weberian sense at all, but a complex, hybrid network where public authority is just one node among many competing epistemic powers.

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Conclusion: Towards a 21st Century Theory of State?

The grand political theories that gave shape and meaning to the 20th-century state are no longer sufficient for our time. The core assumptions of Liberalism and Marxism—and the Pluralist and Developmentalist models that refined or reacted to them—are being rendered inadequate by a world they were not designed to explain. Their shared anthropocentrism is challenged by an ecological crisis that demands a new relationship between humanity and the planet. Their inherent Eurocentrism is being deconstructed by post-colonial critiques that expose the particularity of their supposedly universal claims. And their state-centric view of power is being fragmented by the rise of transnational corporations, global networks, and transformative technologies like artificial intelligence. The modern Theory of State is in crisis.

Yet, from the fragments of these critiques, the outlines of a new understanding may be emerging. While no single emerging framework offers a complete, standalone Theory of State, each provides an essential corrective, highlighting a dimension of reality that the classical theories ignored.

• Post-Colonialism and Southern Theory provide the essential historical and global context. They compel any future theory to abandon the pretense of universality and to account for the enduring legacies of imperialism and the deep inequalities of power and knowledge that structure our world. They demand a theory that is plural, not singular.
• Ecological Theories—Ecocentrism, Deep Ecology, and Ecofeminism—provide the biophysical grounding. They insist that the state cannot be conceived in isolation from the natural world upon which all human life depends. They demand a radical redefinition of sovereignty, shifting its basis from territorial control to ecological stewardship.
• The analysis of Technocentric Governance and AI reveals a fundamental transformation in the nature of power itself. It shows that authority is increasingly tied not to territory or institutions, but to the control of data and algorithms, creating a new “epistemic” dimension of power that fragments the state’s traditional claim to rational-legal authority.
• The concept of Hybridity provides the descriptive language for the messy, overlapping, and networked forms of governance that are actually emerging in practice, blurring the neat lines between public and private, state and non-state, democracy and autocracy.

A coherent and legitimate Theory of State for the 21st century cannot be a monolithic blueprint recovered from the past. It must be a composite, hybrid theory that synthesizes the core insights of these powerful critiques. It would need to be a theory for a post-sovereign, post-anthropocentric, post-Eurocentric, and post-epistemically-monopolistic state. Such a state would derive its legitimacy not from a single, totalizing source—be it the consent of the governed, the will of the proletariat, or the mandate of heaven—but from its demonstrated capacity to navigate and balance these multiple, competing demands. Its primary function would shift from that of an absolute sovereign exercising command and control to that of a crucial, but not all-powerful, facilitator within a complex, polycentric, and global system of governance. Its success would be measured by its ability to simultaneously protect individual and collective rights, ensure ecological sustainability, manage technological power responsibly, and pursue justice in a profoundly unequal world. Crafting such a theory is the central intellectual and political challenge of our era.

Table 2: Emerging Frameworks’ Contributions to a Theory of State

Analytical Category	Post-Colonialism / Southern Theory	Ecological Theories (Ecocentrism, Deep Ecology, Ecofeminism)	Technocentric / AI Frameworks
Core Critique of the Traditional State	The modern state is a Eurocentric, colonial imposition that perpetuates global power hierarchies and erases non-Western experiences. 19	The state is anthropocentric, treating nature as a mere resource and ignoring the intrinsic value of the ecosystem, leading to planetary crisis. 22	The state’s traditional rational-legal authority is being eroded by corporate control of technology and the fragmentation of evidence and knowledge. 25
Proposed Source of Legitimacy	De-colonized authenticity; ability to represent subaltern voices and resist neocolonial domination. Legitimacy is primarily a problem to be solved, not a given. 21	Ecological stewardship; the ability to protect the integrity and flourishing of the entire biotic community. An ethic of care and sustainability. 29	Efficiency, rationality, and the ability to manage complexity through data and expert systems. Legitimacy is contested between state, corporate, and community actors. 25
Implied State Structure	Radically plural and diverse; potentially non-state or post-state forms of political organization that are culturally and historically specific. 34	Decentralized, organized around bioregions rather than nation-states; based on principles of local autonomy and direct democracy. 23	A hybrid network where the state is one actor among powerful tech corporations and other non-state entities. Potential for “digital authoritarianism” or more participatory models. 25
Primary Challenge to Coherence	Offers a powerful critique but struggles to provide a single, prescriptive model for a future state, risking fragmentation into pure relativism. 39	Faces immense practical challenges in overcoming entrenched human interests and requires a radical, perhaps unrealistic, transformation of global values and population levels. 41	The concentration of epistemic and economic power in private corporations may make the state unable to govern effectively in the public interest, leading to corporate capture or instability. 25

Footnotes

¹ Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78. Referenced in.⁴⁴

² R.M. MacIver, The Modern State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926); Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). Referenced in.⁴⁴

³ Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. Referenced in.⁴⁵

⁴ John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1980); Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). Referenced in.²

⁵ “Liberalism,” Encyclopædia Britannica, last modified September 19, 2023, https://www.britannica.com/topic/liberalism. Referenced in.⁹

⁶ Locke, Second Treatise. Referenced in.²

⁷ “The Liberal Theory of State,” Drishti IAS, last modified November 15, 2023, https://www.drishtiias.com/blog/the-liberal-theory-of-state. Referenced in.¹

⁸ “Liberalism,” Wikipedia, last modified May 28, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberalism. Referenced in.²

⁹ Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776). Referenced in.⁹

¹⁰ Paul Starr, “Why Liberalism Works,” chap. 1 in Freedom’s Power: The True Force of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 1-25. Referenced in.⁴⁶

¹¹ Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). The concept of the “night-watchman state” is a core tenet of libertarian thought, a modern extension of classical liberalism. Referenced in.¹

¹² Starr, “Why Liberalism Works,” 2. Referenced in.⁴⁶

¹³ Smith, Wealth of Nations. Referenced in.¹

¹⁴ T. H. Green, “Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract,” in The Political Theory of T.H. Green: Selected Writings, ed. John R. Rodman (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964). Referenced in.¹

¹⁵ Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). Referenced in.¹

¹⁶ “The Liberal Theory of State,” Drishti IAS. Referenced in.¹

¹⁷ Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944); Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Referenced in.¹

¹⁸ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848). Referenced in.¹⁰

¹⁹ Karl Marx, “Preface” to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859). Referenced in.¹⁶

²⁰ Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884). Referenced in.³

²¹ Vladimir Lenin, The State and Revolution (1917), chap. 1, quoting Engels. Referenced in.⁴

²² Tony Horne, “What are the features of the Marxian theory of a state?” Quora, May 15, 2020. Referenced in.⁴

²³ “Marxism,” Investopedia, last modified March 27, 2024, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marxism.asp. Referenced in.⁴⁷

²⁴ “Key Tenets of Marxism vs. America’s Philosophical Foundations,” Freethinking Ministries, accessed May 30, 2024, https://freethinkingministries.com/key-tenets-of-marxism-vs-americas-philosophical-foundations/. Referenced in.¹⁰

²⁵ Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, chap. 2. Referenced in.⁴

²⁶ “Marxist Theory of State,” Testbook, accessed May 30, 2024, https://testbook.com/ias-preparation/marxist-theory-of-state. Referenced in.¹³

²⁷ Engels, Anti-Dühring (1878), Part 3, chap. 2. Referenced in.¹³

²⁸ “2. Theories of State PSIR,” Politics for India, accessed May 30, 2024, https://politicsforindia.com/2-theories-of-state-psir/. Referenced in.³

²⁹ “Pluralism (political theory),” Wikipedia, last modified April 22, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluralism_(political_theory. Referenced in.⁵

³⁰ Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651); John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832). Referenced in.³

³¹ “2. Theories of State PSIR,” Politics for India. Referenced in.³

³² Harold J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1925); Robert M. MacIver, The Modern State. Referenced in.³

³³ “Pluralist Theory of State,” LotusArise, accessed May 30, 2024, https://lotusarise.com/pluralist-theory-of-state/. Referenced in.¹¹

³⁴ Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). Referenced in.⁵

³⁵ “Pluralist Theory of State,” LotusArise. Referenced in.¹¹

³⁶ Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). Referenced in.⁵

³⁷ Navid Pourmokhtari, “A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR: The Contradictory Legacy of a ‘West-centric’ Discipline,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2013): 145-167. Referenced in.⁴⁸

³⁸ “Postcolonialism in International Relations Theory,” E-International Relations, December 8, 2017, https://www.e-ir.info/2017/12/08/postcolonialism-in-international-relations-theory/. Referenced in.²¹

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Raewyn Connell, Southern Theory: The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Science (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). Referenced in.⁴⁹

⁴¹ Ibid., vii. Referenced in.⁴⁰

⁴² Raewyn Connell, “Southern Theory: The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Science,” Development Education Review, no. 16 (2012): 28-34. Referenced in.⁵⁰

⁴³ “Postcolonialism in International Relations Theory,” E-International Relations. Referenced in.²¹

⁴⁴ Hamza Alavi, “The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh,” New Left Review I, no. 74 (July-August 1972): 59–81. Referenced in.³⁵

⁴⁵ “Post colonial State or State In Developing Societies,” LotusArise, accessed May 30, 2024, https://lotusarise.com/postcolonial-theory-of-state/. Referenced in.³⁵

⁴⁶ “Postcolonialism,” Wikipedia, last modified May 23, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postcolonialism. Referenced in.²⁸

⁴⁷ “Developmental state,” Wikipedia, last modified May 25, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Developmental_state. Referenced in.⁷

⁴⁸ Peter Futo, “The Theory of Developmental State,” Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 10070 (2007): 1. Referenced in.¹⁷

⁴⁹ Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Referenced in.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). Referenced in.⁷

⁵¹ Ibid. Referenced in.⁵²

⁵² Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Referenced in.⁸

⁵³ “The developmental state: A concept in search of a future,” Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute, SPERI Paper No. 20 (2015). Referenced in.⁵¹

⁵⁴ “Developmental State Model,” Fiveable, accessed May 30, 2024, https://library.fiveable.me/key-terms/introduction-comparative-politics/developmental-state-model. Referenced in.¹⁴

⁵⁵ “The Developmental State in the Globalizing World,” E-International Relations, December 22, 2010, https://www.e-ir.info/2010/12/22/the-developmental-state-in-the-globalizing-world/. Referenced in.⁸

⁵⁶ Michel Loriaux, “The French Developmental State as Myth and Moral Ambition,” in The Developmental State, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 235-275. Referenced in.¹⁷

⁵⁷ “Towards a New Development Theory for the Global South,” Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, January 14, 2025. Referenced in.⁵³

⁵⁸ “Ecocentrism,” Wikipedia, last modified May 16, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecocentrism. Referenced in.²²

⁵⁹ “Ecocentrism,” EBSCO Research Starters, accessed May 30, 2024, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/science/ecocentrism. Referenced in.⁵⁴

⁶⁰ Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949). Referenced in.²²

⁶¹ Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary,” Inquiry 16, no. 1 (1973): 95–100. Referenced in.⁴¹

⁶² Ibid. Referenced in.⁵⁶

⁶³ Arne Naess and George Sessions, “The Basic Principles of Deep Ecology” (1984). The eight principles are widely cited. See, for example, “Eight Principles of Deep Ecology,” The Permaculture Project, https://www.permacultureproject.com/resources/eight-principles-of-deep-ecology/. Referenced in.⁴¹

⁶⁴ Megan Forsythe, “Deep Ecology and the Greening of the International System,” Global Justice and an Interdisciplinary Field 1, no. 1 (2008): 74-89. Referenced in.²⁹

⁶⁵ Matthew Paterson, “Green Theory,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Referenced in.²³

⁶⁶ “Deep Ecology Platform is Drafted,” EBSCO Research Starters, accessed May 30, 2024, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/deep-ecology-platform-drafted. Referenced in.³⁶

⁶⁷ “Ecofeminism,” Wikipedia, last modified May 20, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecofeminism. Referenced in.⁵⁸

⁶⁸ Françoise d’Eaubonne, Le Féminisme ou la Mort (Paris: Pierre Horay, 1974). Referenced in.⁵⁸

⁶⁹ Karen J. Warren, “The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism,” Environmental Ethics 12, no. 2 (1990): 125–46. Referenced in.⁵⁸

⁷⁰ “Ecofeminism,” Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed May 30, 2024, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ecofeminism. Referenced in.⁶¹

⁷¹ “Ecofeminism,” Fiveable, accessed May 30, 2024, https://library.fiveable.me/literary-theory-criticism/unit-10/ecofeminism/study-guide/MgC3XRByav1Q0le9. Referenced in.⁶²

⁷² Ibid. Referenced in.⁶²

⁷³ Nazanin Nadi, “Ecofeminism: A Holistic Approach to Social and Ecological Justice,” Praxis Publication, accessed May 30, 2024, https://praxispublication.com/en/ecofeminism/. Referenced in.⁶⁴

⁷⁴ La Via Campesina, “8th International Conference of La Via Campesina – Nyéléni, Managua 2021a,” quoted in Mine Islar, “Food Sovereignty as a Feminist Project,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 50, no. 5 (2023): 1-22, https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2022.2153042. Referenced in.³⁰

⁷⁵ Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development (London: Zed Books, 1988). Referenced in.⁶⁵

⁷⁶ The concept of Westphalian sovereignty is a cornerstone of IR theory. Referenced in.²³

⁷⁷ Paterson, “Green Theory.” Referenced in.²³

⁷⁸ Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162, no. 3859 (1968): 1243–48. Referenced in.²³

⁷⁹ Karen T. Litfin, “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics,” Mershon International Studies Review 41, no. 2 (1997): 167–204. A similar argument is made in.⁴²

⁸⁰ “Rethinking the Ecology-Sovereignty Debate,” ResearchGate, accessed May 30, 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240731942_Rethinking_the_Ecology-Sovereignty_Debate. Referenced in.⁶⁷

⁸¹ “Hybrid Regime,” Populism Studies, accessed May 30, 2024, https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/hybrid-regime/. Referenced in.⁶⁸

⁸² “Hybrid regime,” Wikipedia, last modified May 15, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_regime. Referenced in.⁶⁹

⁸³ “Hybrid Regime,” Fiveable, accessed May 30, 2024, https://library.fiveable.me/key-terms/intro-to-poli-sci/hybrid-regime. Referenced in.⁷⁰

⁸⁴ Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 5–21. Referenced in.⁶⁸

⁸⁵ Parag Khanna and Karan Khemka, “The rise of hybrid governance,” McKinsey & Company, June 1, 2012, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/the-rise-of-hybrid-governance. Referenced in.³⁷

⁸⁶ “Hybrid institutions and governance,” Wikipedia, last modified January 2, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_institutions_and_governance. Referenced in.⁷¹

⁸⁷ Francesco Colona and Rivke Jaffe, “Hybrid Governance Arrangements: A View from the South,” European Journal of Development Research 28 (2016): 1-9. Referenced in.⁷²

⁸⁸ “Technocracy,” Wikipedia, last modified May 27, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technocracy. Referenced in.³²

⁸⁹ “The Technocratic Society: Evolution from Philosophical Ideals to Today’s Governance,” Medium, November 23, 2023, https://medium.com/tecnosophia/the-technocratic-society-evolution-from-philosophical-ideals-to-todays-governance-29e5e211d757. Referenced in.⁷³

⁹⁰ The idea of applying the scientific method to social problems is a core tenet of early socialist thinkers like Henri de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte. Referenced in.³²

⁹¹ Mathias Risse, Political Theory of the Digital Age: Where Artificial Intelligence Might Take Us (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023). Referenced in.⁷⁴

⁹² “Artificial Intelligence for Citizen Services and Government,” Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School, February 2024. Referenced in.⁷⁵

⁹³ Philippa Sigl-Glöckner and Paul-Jasper Dittrich, “AI is political – let’s use it to really transform society,” CEPS, October 11, 2023, https://www.ceps.eu/ai-is-political-lets-use-it-to-really-transform-society/. Referenced in.²⁷

⁹⁴ Raluca Csernatoni, “Can Democracy Survive the Disruptive Power of AI?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 12, 2024. Referenced in.³⁸

⁹⁵ Blayne Haggart, “We Can Harness Digital Citizenship to Confront AI Risks,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, May 26, 2023, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/we-can-harness-digital-citizenship-to-confront-ai-risks/. Referenced in.⁴³

⁹⁶ Corporate Europe Observatory, “Big Tech’s Web of Influence in the EU,” CEO Report (Brussels: Corporate Europe Observatory, 2023), 34-38. Referenced in.²⁵

⁹⁷ “Contested Authority: How Evidence Shapes AI Ethics Debates,” User Uploaded Document. Referenced in.²⁵

⁹⁸ Ibid. See also Eric L. Piza et al., “RAND Evaluation of Chicago’s Predictive Policing Pilot,” RAND Corporation Research Report (Santa Monica: RAND, 2021), 45-47. Referenced in.²⁵

⁹⁹ Clare Garvie, “The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America,” Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & Technology (2023): 34-38. Referenced in.²⁵

¹⁰⁰ Sabelo Mhlambi, “From Rationality to Relationality: Ubuntu as an Ethical and Human Rights Framework for Artificial Intelligence Governance,” Carr Center Discussion Paper Series 2020-009 (Cambridge: Harvard Kennedy School, 2020), 7-9. Referenced in.²⁵

¹⁰¹ Stephanie Russo Carroll et al., “The CARE Principles for Indigenous Data Governance,” Data Science Journal 19, no. 1 (2020): 43. Referenced in.²⁵

¹⁰² Human Rights Watch, “The Electronic Whip: Amazon’s System of Surveillance and Control,” HRW Report (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2023), 45-52; Kashmir Hill, “Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm,” New York Times, June 24, 2020. Referenced in.²⁵

¹⁰³ “Contested Authority: How Evidence Shapes AI Ethics Debates.” Referenced in.²⁵

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. See also Corporate Europe Observatory, “Big Tech’s Web of Influence,” and Global Partnership on AI, “Membership and Participation Analysis 2024,” GPAI Secretariat (Paris: OECD, 2024), 8-11. Referenced in.²⁵

¹⁰⁵ Weber, “Politics as a Vocation.” Referenced in.⁴⁴

¹⁰⁶ “Contested Authority: How Evidence Shapes AI Ethics Debates.” Referenced in.²⁵

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. Research shows that 86% of high-level European Commission AI meetings were with industry representatives.